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ABSTRACT
This dissertation addresses the relationship between 
the Pigovian and Coasian schools of externality policy.
By varying the definition of the aggregate externality 
constraint, the results of Pigou as well as those of Coase 
are obtained. The Pigovian problem is one of public recep­
tion of pollution; the Coasian problem is one of locational 
confinement of pollution. The model shows that private 
internalization will achieve efficiency in the Coasian 
case where bargaining is possible regardless of the lia­
bility rule. Moreover, if bargaining is prohibited in the 
Coasian case (i.e., the large number problem), the effi­




Since the "externality revolution" of the 1960's two 
theoretical approaches have been accepted as offering effi­
cient solutions to spillover problems. In terms of his­
torical development the work of A. C. Pigou comes first.
The Pigovian tradition is well summarized by Fisher and 
Peterson. (76, page 12)
Suppose a firm's production generates . . .  an 
externality that directly affects other economic 
agents. Then the marginal social cost of production 
will diverge from the marginal private cost, and 
the firm will produce "too much" pollution. The 
implied policy is to levy a tax equal to the dif­
ference between marginal social and marginal 
private costs.
Much later, as externalities became a household word in the 
profession, an analysis by R. H. Coase began to have a 
major impact on the theoretical discussion. His results 
have come to be known as the Coase Theorem. The theorem 
holds that when the actions of one firm affect another, 
for competitive industries and in the absence of trans­
actions costs, the firms will be forced by their own maxi­
mizing behavior to bargain to a solution that is socially 
efficient. While both Pigou and Coase seem to describe a 
similar problem their solutions differ. Is it that the
vi
problems differ, or is one of the solutions theoretically 
incorrect?
It has been suggested by many writers, notably Buchanan 
(73) , that the problems differ simply in terms of the number 
of affected parties. If there is a large number of affected 
parties, Pigovian policy is called for;'** if there is a 
small number, the Coase Theorem holds. However, this 
dichotomy does not resolve the conflict completely. The 
question of "Who should pay?" still confounds the correct­
ness of both the Pigovian tax and the Coase Theorem.
Baumol, in assessing Coase's attack on the Pigovian 
tradition, says that even in the large number case Coase's 
arguments pose the following question: "Should not a tax
sometimes be levied, at least in part on those who choose 
to live near the factory rather than upon the factory 
owners?" (72, Page 309) Baumol answers this question 
negatively and reaffirms the single Pigovian tax. However, 
Meade (52) and Gould (73) show Pigovian taxing models where 
the damaged party should be compensated. Also, Tybout (72), 
Schulze and d'Arge (74), Shapiro (74), and more recently 
Hansmann (77) all argue that the Coase solution fails to 
achieve optimality under alternative definitions of pro­
perty rights (payment flows).
^Although Coase and Buchanan may not agree with 
Pigovian policy in any case, when the number of externality 
affected parties is large, they offer no alternative.
vii
The basic controversy continues. Under what circum­
stances are Pigovian taxes, as opposed to private internal­
ization, necessary to achieve efficiency? If private 
internalization fails, what is the appropriate structure 
of the tax? If private negotiation is possible, will the 
parties correctly internalize the spillover? The major 
objective of this research is to suggest and to attempt 
to clarify some of the answers to these three questions.
A model is developed that allows for either the Pigovian 
or Coasian assumptions. The Pareto welfare conditions are 
derived and examined in each case. Finally, the policy 
implications are discussed.
The findings of this research suggest two important 
analytical points. First, a more elaborate taxonomy of 
externalities than that offered by Buchanan is required.
The taxonomy offered by this research incorporates the 
notion of public versus private externality reception, as 
presented by Meade (52) and Gould (73), into the classi­
fication scheme based on the number of externality affected 
2
parties. This more elaborate classification allows for 
alternative representations of the aggregate externality
2
Although the definitions are pursued extensively in 
Chapter II we can state here that public externality recep­
tion occurs when the amount received by one firm does not 
diminish the amount available to others. A private exter­
nality exists when the reception by one firm does limit the 
reception by others.
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effects. It is then shown under what circumstances 
Pigovian policies are appropriate and where only Coasian 
prescriptions yield efficiency.
The second analytical contribution offered by this 
research is the importance of the notion that some exter­
nalities are spatially bounded. The locational restriction 
imposed by this bounding limits the number of firms. The 
explicit recognition of locations confinement of spillovers* 
allows the Coase Theorem to be viewed as an adaptation of 
the efficiency properties of rents on land. It also forms 
a distinction between Coasian and Pigovian cases.
The models developed in this research draw on these 
two contributions: the extended taxonomy and the explicit
treatment of locational confinement of externalities. The 
conclusions of the research are: 1) The Coase Theorem is
applicable in certain cases, some of which have not been 
previously demonstrated. The Coase Theorem suggests optimal 
taxing models that are not part of the Pigovian tradition;
2) The unilateral Pigovian tax may be of only limited 
importance because few problems satisfy the conditions 
that call for its application; 3) The bilateral tax/ 
subsidy scheme of Meade and Gould is efficient in certain 
cases that may be more common than those calling for the 
simple Pigovian tax.
The analysis yielding these results begins in Chapter 
I with a review of the literature. A historical outline
ix
of the existing literature is used. Although the main 
goal of the literature review is to outline the back­
ground for the classification scheme used herein, it should 
also indicate to the reader the breadth of the rift between 
the two schools. Historically, the Coase Theorem has clashed
with the Pigovian tradition of unilaterial taxes or sub- 
3
sidies. Baumol (72) opens his article with the statement, 
"It is ironic that just at the moment when the Pigovian 
tradition has some hope of acceptance in application it 
should find itself under a cloud in the theoretical litera­
ture." (page 307)
Chapter II presents the alternative taxonomy drawn 
from the literature cited in Chapter I. Chapter III 
develops the Pareto welfare model used to identify the 
optimality conditions for the various types of exter­
nality problems. The optimality conditions are derived 
and interpreted. Chapter IV elaborates on the development 
of the Pareto conditions of Chapter III for the Coasian 
cases. The importance of locational restriction for the 
Coasian cases is discussed. Chapter V demonstrates the 
validity of the Coase Theorem under zero transactions 
costs and locational confinement of the externality.
Finally, Chapter VI discusses the findings in terms 
of the reconciliation of the Pigou-Coase controversy. The
3
See, especially, Buchannan and. Stubblebine (62).
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claims of Coase and Pigou are set forth, and a qualitative 
discussion of the importance of each is undertaken. The 
goals of this research are to reconcile the Pigovian and 
Coasian traditions, to indicate the variations in the appro­
priate tax prescriptions, to demonstrate the correctness 
of the Coase Theorem and to develop its place in a general 
outline of externality problems. A discussion of the 




A REVIEW OF THE PERTINENT LITERATURE 
Introduction
This research is initiated by the fact that there is 
apparently an unresolved conflict between the Pigovian and 
Coasian schools of externality theory. This conflict is 
evidenced by the arguments against the Pigovian tax made by 
proponents of the Coase Theorem, by disagreements among 
Pigovian supporters concerning the form of the tax, and by 
propositions that efficiency does not obtain in the Coasian 
case due to the effect of competitive entry and exit of 
firms. The purpose of this dissertation is to offer a 
reconciliation of the competing traditions. The purpose 
of this chapter is to identify the inconsistencies in the 
theory.
Specifically, the goals of this research are threefold: 
1) develop an outline of externality problems which include 
both Pigovian and Coasian definitions; 2) examine the type 
of government policy necessary where private internalization
1
2is impossible; 3) demonstrate the efficiency properties of 
private internalization where it is possible.
This paper divides externalities into four categories 
based on the distinctions between large or small numbers of 
involved firms and public or private externality reception. 
This distinction is important in achieving the first goal 
of the study, i.e., developing a complete outline of exter­
nality problems. Although the threads of such distinctions 
exist in the current literature, as discussed below, the 
externality literature has not made such distinctions in a 
rigorous fashion.
After discussing the debate between the followers of 
Pigou versus those of Coase, the recent literature on the 
Coase Theorem itself is reviewed. Special interest is 
placed on the industry adjustment discussions of the contri­
butors .
Before beginning the review of the literature a formal 
definition of externality is necessary to guide and limit 
the research.
A technological externality exists when the actions of 
one firm enter the production function of other firms and 
there is no explicit market regulating these effects.
Hence, the two modes for internalization of the spillover 
are either government intervention or private bargaining
among the individual parties.
Consider the following general form of a firm's pro­
duction function.
fl(qi' xi' Y i' Y j) = 0 i?^
Here the term "q^" is the output produced by the i^h firm;
"xi " is its input; "y^" is the variable measuring the spill­
over produced by the i ^ 1 firm; and "y^" is the externality 
received by firm i from firm j. The function f1 (.)
specifies the relationship between these variables for the 
tlri firm. This form may be simply expanded by considering 
the variables within f1 !.) as vectors instead of single 
values. Firm i is said to be the "producer" of an external­
ity when y. >0, and a "receiver" when v. >0. The term 
i “ D
polluter refers to the case where y^ > 0, and 3f-y3y^ < 0,:3/
j^i. In other words, firm i at the margin negatively 
affects firm j 's production.
Review of the Literature: Pigou versus Coase
A. C. Pigou is hailed as the first economist to define 
externalities and to attempt to remedy the social welfare 
loss arising from externalities. While the problem and many 
of the answers actually predate Pigou,^ he offers an explicit
4
See Johnson (73) who shows that as early as 1883,
Henry Sidgwick had a firm grasp of the problems of public 
goods, the free rider, and potential problems with government 
solutions.
4tax/subsidy scheme as a solution to the problem of the 
technological externality. Pigou1s welfare criterion is 
that the national dividend will be maximized if the mar­
ginal social net products are equal. If externalities 
exist, the marginal social net products deviate from the 
private ones and welfare falls short of the maximum. When 
this occurs, Pigou claims it may be possible to achieve this 
maximum by a set of taxes or subsidies that bring private 
and social products into equality. Pigou was uncertain of 
the computational details of this tax/subsidy, but he was 
convinced that such values existed and were determinant.
Although Pigou's position was initially attacked by
5
some, it gained professional acceptance and was further 
developed. Meade (52) developed a specification of the 
magnitude of the appropriate Pigovian tax/subsidy for the 
special class of linearly homogeneous production functions. 
At the same time Meade argued that in some cases both 
taxes and subsidies are necessary to maximize social wel­
fare. This was the first mention of bilaterial intervention
Most notable was Knight“s work (24). Knight cites 
other writers who held his opinion of Pigou8s work.
5outside of reciprocal effects,^ and it is the beginning of 
the public versus private externality distinction developed 
in this paper.
The continued recognition of the Pigovian tax/subsidy 
scheme is evidenced by the treatment accorded it in such 
traditional price theory texts as Henderson and Quandt (58, 
revised 71)0 Notably, the Henderson and Quandt treatment 
is in terms of the Pareto welfare concept and they say 
that the efficiency conditions can be deduced from the 
actions of joint profit maximizing firms. Those sectors of 
the economy characterized by externalities could be thought 
of as two firms. Pareto optimality, then, requires the 
joint profits of the two firms to be maximized. Stated 
another way, the Pareto requirements are that the price of 
good one should equal the marginal costs of the production 
of good one plus the marginal cost (or less the marginal 
benefit) imposed on the production of good two. Henderson 
and Quandt say: "The quantities (of the two goods) that
would be produced under joint profit maximization can be
6
The term reciprocal refers to the case where one 
economic agent's activities affect another in the exter­
nality sense, and at the same time the second party also 
does something to affect the first. This is the case of 
a bilateral externality which, for simplicity's sake and 
with no loss of generality, we can treat as separate cases. 
However, Meade is referring to a bilateral tax/subsidy in 
the case of a unilateral externality. This is clearly 
different from the standard Pigovian analysis.
6enforced by appropriately taxing and subsidizing producers 
if they maximize profits individually." {58, page 217)"^
Coase's work (60) was the first major attack on the 
Pigovian position to become accepted by the profession.
Coase claims that the private market can handle many of the 
divergencies between social and private costs envisioned by 
the writers of the Pigovian tradition. Coase devotes con­
siderable space to considering types of externalities pro­
posed by Pigou and others where a voluntary solution cer­
tainly could have, or had been worked out.
His position against the Pigovian tradition is that 
the mere existence of technological externalities is not 
sufficient to show the necessity for Pigovian taxes/subsidies. 
In most if not all cases, the externalities will be internal­
ized by the independent actions of the participants. Coase 
wondered why, when one observes spillover effects in the 
real world, it is automatically assumed because of their
g
simple existence they are at nonoptimal levels. The 
acceptance of the Pigovian taxing strictures seems to be 
based on such a blind assumption.
7
The "if" in this statement certainly implies something 
like the Coase Theorem. Furthermore, most of the more recent 
work on bargaining has done little more than reiterate this 
analysis.
8
This is especially ironic since the Pigovian solution 
may yield a situation where there is a non-zero level of 
pollution.
7One of Coase*s most famous examples is the case of the 
candy manufacturer and the d o c t o r A  doctor set up resi­
dence next to a confectioner who operated two machines in 
the pursuit of his trade. Things proceeded perfectly well 
for some years until the doctor added a consulting room next 
to the kitchen housing the machines. Because of the noise 
of the machines, the doctor was prevented from . . exam­
ining his patients by auscultation for diseases of the chest 
. . . (and finding it) impossible to engage with effect in 
any occupation which required thought and attention.'" He 
brought suit and won an injunction barring the operation of 
the machines, which the confectioner had been running for 
60 and 26 years respectively. Coase*s conclusion is that:
The court's decision established that the 
doctor had the right to prevent the confectioner 
from using his machinery. But, of course, it 
would have been possible to modify the arrange­
ment envisaged in the legal ruling by means of a 
bargain between the parties. . . . The solution
of the problem depends essentially on whether the 
continued use of the machinery adds more to the con­
fectioner's income than it subtracts from the 
doctor's .
More explicitly, the court's ruling did nothing more than 
define a property right that could then be sold to the high­
est bidder. Coase continues to explain that had the doctor 
lost, the result would have been the same except that the
9
Coase (60), page 729.
8payment flow would have gone in the opposite direction.
Coase argues that the income effects are included in the 
same magnitude in both parties' profit function regardless 
of the direction of flow of the payment. Nothing is changed 
if the property right is reversed, because an opportunity 
cost is the same as a direct c o s t . ^
Closely following Coase1s article was one by Buchanan 
and Stubblebine (62). This article is a more rigorous 
statement of the Coase Theorem. They demonstrate, among 
other things, that a Pigovian tax would not only be unneces­
sary but would lead to inefficient solutions in many cases 
of externalities. Specifically, they show that in external­
ity cases where individual bargaining among participants is 
possible (i.e., small number cases) the Pigovian tax is 
inappropriate. This point forms the basis for the small 
versus large numbers issue. They choose to state their 
case in utility maximization terms thereby avoiding the
10
Coase argues this by saying the party receiving the 
payment will treat the payment as an opportunity cost. For 
the party making the payment it is a direct cost. Note that 
this payment forms the basis of the more recent work on bar­
gaining models of externalities. Also note that in terms of 
the wealth effects for consumers, Dolbear (67) points out 
that changes in wealth due to changes in the externality 
property right, will change the optimal solution quantities 
of the affected parties.
9wealth distribution problem that might affect firms in long 
run industry equilibria.^
Buchanan and Stubblebine define various states of 
exchange between two individuals interlocked in an external­
ity. Of importance is the fact that at the Pareto equili­
brium, the externality still has a marginal effect. The 
imposition of a Pigovian tax to reach Pareto optimality will 
have the result that the negatively affected party will bid 
the solution past Pareto optimality toward too little pollu­
tion .
■^Buchanan and Stubblebine lucidly handle the question 
of the usage of the tax revenues that result from the govern­
ment intervention. Shibata (72) argues against the Buchanan 
and Stubblebine treatment of the tax revenues and the possi­
ble Pareto repercussions that might result. Specifically, 
Shibata tries to demonstrate that it is not the tax which 
Buchanan and Stubblebine claim will lead to inefficiency but 
the use of the revenues of the tax. The Buchanan and 
Stubblebine (72) reply to Shibata's criticisms is well 
taken and forms the qist of the position we take concerning 
the tax problem. The Pareto conditions derived in the fol­
lowing chapters are sets of relationships that show the 
interactions between not only the production sectors of the 
economy but also the consumption sector. The first order 
Pareto conditions must be met to achieve optimality. But, 
as is well known, there are an infinity of options from 
which to choose. Any complete fiscal policy must defini- 
tionally include some implicit or explicit definition or 
redefinition of property rights. Thus, for instance, if all 
the optimal tax revenues are given consumer j , he will real­
locate his consumption pattern in line with a changed income 
flow. This in turn may affect the demand and supply curves 
for goods and the resources respectively, but at the equi­
librium point, the tax having been recomputed to account 
for these changes in demand and supply, the relative prices 
between the goods in the economy will have to embody the 
stated Pareto conditions for efficiency to exist.
10
The Buchanan and Stubblebine position can best be sum­
med up by the following quote:
The important implication to be drawn is that full 
Pareto equilibrium can never be attained via the 
imposition of unilaterally imposed taxes and sub­
sidies until all marginal externalities are 
eliminated. (page 383)
While they do not state it explicitly, the implication is 
clear that the Pigovian policy is never applicable unless 
it is unnecessary. If marginal externalities are elimi­
nated, the Pareto optimum is attained.
Extending the analysis of Buchanan and Stubblebine, 
Turvey (63) and Wellisz (64) show that large numbers of 
affected parties will increase the transactions cost of a 
bargained solution to the point that marginal external­
ities, in the Buchanan and Stubblebine sense, are eliminated. 
This brought forth the admission from Buchanan (66) that 
the bargaining process would possibly cause the market to 
move toward the optimal equilibrium, but bargaining costs 
might prohibit the attainment of full optimality.
Finally, Baumol (72) makes the point that the Pigovian 
tax is the appropriate mechanism by which to achieve opti­
mality when the bargaining cost of reaching a solution is 
prohibitive. Baumol states:
Despite the various criticisms which have been 
raised against it, in the large numbers case, 
which is of primary importance in reality and 
to which Pigovian analysis directs itself, his
11
tax/subsidy programs are generally those required
for an optimal allocation of resources. (page 3 0 7 ) ^
When there can be no private interaction to internalize the 
technological spillover, the Pigovian unilateral tax pres­
criptions are appropriate. The assumption that no inter­
action is possible negates the Buchanan and Stubblebine
attack on Pigovian taxes.
Baumol argues in what appears to be an a priori fashion 
for Pigovian policy the same as Buchanan does against it.
The question of when the numbers are too large to allow 
for a voluntary solution is left unanswered by both writers.
Tracing the literature in this fashion draws the focus 
on the large/small distinction in the number of affected 
parties? in the small number case the parties can reach an 
optimal solution, whereas in the large number case the 
unilateral Pigovian tax is called for.
However, there is the objection to the type of tax;
Baumol's arguments differ from Meade's interpretation of 
the Pigovian tax. The question of the nature of appropri­
ate tax leads one to question further both the Pigovian 
tradition and Coase's theorem if in fact they are reconciled 
in terms of the number of affected parties.
■^Baumol's disclaimer, "generally," refers to the ful­
fillment of second order conditions which would affect any 
solution. In an earlier work (64) he had made the argument 
that the second order conditions of externality-affected 
profit maximization would rarely be fulfilled.
12
Public Versus Private Externalities
Baumol clearly states that his "solution calls for
neither taxes upon (the receiving firms), nor compensation
to that industry for the damage it suffers," (72, page 311).
Kneese and Bower (68) agree that taxing the pollution alone
will achieve the social optimum if bargaining is pre- 
13eluded. However, other writers claim that compensation 
must be made to achieve the optimum solution.
Baumol1s claim is simple. The Pareto conditions 
require that the price (P^) •'■n t i^e pollution producing 
industry reflect both the cost of that good and the cost 
imposed on the pollution receiving industry; the require­
ments on price (l^ t*ie pollution receiving industry do 
not show that P^ should reflect any extra remuneration (in 
real terms). He says this makes perfectly good sense because 
the cost of the pollution itself (the smoke) will limit 
entry into the polluted industry (the laundry). He states:
A high tax rate will discourage smoke and hence 
encourage migration into the neighborhood. A low 
tax rate will encourage smoke and, hence, drive 
residents away. A tax on smoke alone is all that 
is needed to control the magnitudes of both vari­
ables. That is why, as shown by the mathematics 
of the preceding section, just a tax on the smoke 
producer is sufficient to produce an optimal allo­
cation of resources among all the activities in 
our model. (72, page 312)
Kneese and Bower (68), page 100.
13
Later on he reports that Coase, in a letter, expresses 
concern that the tax will not be adjusted if more laundries 
enter the polluted area. Baumol writes:
But even on this issue Coase's strictures are
not necessarily valid. Suppose that a regulator, 
having no way of calculating the optimal values of 
the Pigovian tax is, however, able to determine the 
value of any marginal social damage at any point in
time. "Faut de mieux" he therefore sets a tax rate
equal to current marginal social damage on the
smoke producer. This causes him to reduce his
smoke, and so brings more laundries into the neigh­
borhood. The tax is then readjusted to equal the 
new (higher) value of damage per puff of smoke, 
more laundries move in, and so on. Will this pro­
cess of trial and error adjustments of the tax
level, always setting it equal to current marginal 
smoke damage, converge to the optimum of Section 
II? That is, will the sequence of tax values con­
verge to the optimal Pigovian tax level, and will 
resource allocation approach optimality? That now 
seems to be Coase1s main question, (page 315)
He then explains that given the usual assumptions of con­
vexities the system will be stable.
However, the mathematical expression of Baumol's model 
is not constrained to negative externalities and, therefore, 
implies that the receiver of a positive externality should 
not have to pay for the reception of such. Meade's article^ 
on bees and externalities argues against such a scheme.
While both authors agree that the producer of an externality
Meade (52).
14
should receive treatment by the taxing authority,15 Meade 
claims that the receiver of an externality should also pay 
or receive compensation so that an optimum will be achieved.
Meade uses a number of different models but in his 
most simple case he has two industries characterized by the 
following production functions:
x = H 1 (l1 , c^, x )
x2 = H2 (12 , c2 ),
where "1" is labor and "c" is capital, and the externality 
is positive. Both functions are assumed to be linearly 
homogeneous. A social optimum exists, he asserts, when the 
value of the marginal social net product is equal to the 
marginal payment made to each factor. Capital is the hir­
ing factor; hence, its payment is the residual of output 
less labor's payment. The assumption of homogeneity implies 
that the summation of elasticities with respect to output 
and each factor will equal one; i.e.,
xi X! xx
E. + E + E = 1 .  
il C1 x2
Meade shows that c^ must be taxed at the rate of
X1 X1 —  E
C1 x2
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Such treatment would be taxation of pollution and 
subsidization of a positive externality.
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in order to be paid the value of its marginal social net 
product. This result is in direct contradiction to Baumol's 
conclusions.
Both Baumol and Meade agree that the "producer" of the 
externality should be compensated or taxed commensurate with 
the nature of the externality. However, in one model the 
"receiver" also undergoes treatment by the taxing authority 
while in the other it is left alone. (Where the taxing 
authority is unconcerned with the receiver, the magnitude 
of the externality itself determines the amount of resources 
expended in the externality receiving industry.)
Even though his analysis discusses the notion of an 
unpriced factor, Meade's verbal arguments are in terms of 
atmospheric effects. His terminology and verbal arguments 
clearly guide the analysis toward a distinction between 
public and private effects. A paper by Gould (73) takes up 
Meade's verbal arguments and develops the difference between 
types of externalities based on their reception character­
istics. Gould distinguished between public and private 
externalities calling private externalities free access (or 
common-property or non-exclusive) resources. In the normal 
use of the term, a common access resource is a private good 
for which property rights are not enforced. Gould's con­
cept of this free access resource is that the receivers of
16
a positive externality will impose externalities on each 
other if there is no charge for the resource. While he 
does not formally state the concept, the implication is 
clear: the externalities that the receivers impose on one
another are the type that are purely pecuniary in normal 
markets. Because the externality is scarce, optimality 
reauires that it be rationed by price. Conversely, if the 
externality is not scarce (i.e., public in its reception) 
no charge is warranted.
Following the article by Gould the profession seems to 
accept now that there are two levels of distinction in 
externality theory, even though these two have not been 
acceptably integrated. Buchanan (73) offers what might 
be considered a summary of the two. Table 1-1 presents 
Buchanan's taxonomy. A negative externality is assumed:
Firm One(s) pollute(s) Firm Two(s). In Buchanan's opinion 
Cases 1 through 8 characterize all possible states of exter­
nality situations. The entries in Table 1-1 indicate the 
Pareto optimality results that Buchanan predicts.
In Case 3, Buchanan seems to grasp the issue of public­
ness. Here, he seems to be saying that it is the publicness 
of the reception that causes inefficiency. However, in Case 
4, which according to Meade-Gould should be the reciprocal 
of Case 3, Buchanan drops the notion of public reception.
TABLE 1-1
BUCHANAN'S OUTLINE OF EXTERNALITIES
One Firm One 
One Firm Two
CASE 1 - Bargaining yields 
efficient solution
CASE 2 - Bargaining yields 
efficient solution
One Firm One 
Many Firm Twos
CASE 3 - Inefficiency results due 
to publicness interaction 
among Firm Twos
CASE 4 - Inefficiency due to 
holdout powers of 
each Firm Two
Many Firm Ones 
One Firm Two
CASE 5 - Efficiency results with 
minor bargaining costs
CASE 6 - Efficiency results 
with minor bargain­
ing costs
Many Firm Ones 
Many Firm Twos
CASE 7 - Inefficiency results due to 
publicness interaction 
among Firm Twos
CASE 8 - Inefficiency results 
due to holdout power 
of each Firm Two
Firm One(s) Has (Have) 
Legal Property Right
Firm Two(s) Has (Have) 
Legal Property Right
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He claims it is the free rider problem (or high bargaining 
costs or the large number question) which causes ineffici­
ency. Holdout power refers to the free rider problem which 
is not necessarily caused by publicness. The implication of 
the Meade-Gould analysis is that a unilateral tax on Firm 
One is appropriate in the public case. Hence, in the case 
of true publicness of externality reception, if we were to 
cure the holdout problem in Buchanan's Case 4, bargaining 
would still yield an inefficient result because Firm Twos 
receive payments. Furthermore, the mere existence of many 
externality receivers is not sufficient to cause a failure 
in bargaining. Clearly, Buchanan has not presented the true 
ramifications of the concept of publicness. Cases 7 and 8 
may have elements of either publicness or privateness, but 
are inefficiently cured by the market because of the large
number problem. It is, therefore, not clear whether
Buchanan is referring to the large number problems when he 
uses the term public or whether he is alluding to Gould's 
concept of it.
The confusion that arises over the relationship of the 
Pigovian and Coasian schools leads to doubt about the valid­
ity of the Coase Theorem. The question of who should pay in 
the Pigovian case leads to a question of who should pay in
the Coasian case. This then leads to the question of the
19
efficiency properties of the Coase Theorem when industry 
adjustments are accounted for.
Industry Adjustments and the Coase Theorem
The most recent literature abounds with mathematical
1 f iproofs of the Coase Theorem. These proofs are based upon
the equality between the first order conditions for Pareto
optimality in an economy affected by externality problems
and the first order conditions of profit maximization for
one-on-one bargaining solutions. However, these efforts to
establish the validity of the Coase Theorem are incomplete
in their handling of industry adjustments.
The question of long run versus short run industry
equilibria has been approached in the literature from time
to time, though seldom in a rigorous manner.^ The pro-
Coasian position is expressed aptly by Calabresi:
Various writers— including me— accepted that con­
clusion (Coase Theorem) for the short run, but had 
doubts about its validity in the long run situ­
ation. . . .
Further thought has convinced me that if one 
assumes no transactions costs— including no costs
16
The best work to date is by Gifford and Stone (73). 
Another article by Gifford (74) presents the implied graphical 
analysis in total profit terms.
^ T h e  exceptions are Tybout (72) and Schulze and 
d'Arge (74) whose analyses are incorrect. Both find that 
inefficiency results.
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of excluding from the benefits the free loaders, 
that is those who would gain from a bargain but 
who are unwilling to pay to bring it about— and if 
one assumes, as one must, rationality and no legal 
impediments to bargaining, Coase's analysis must 
hold for the long run as well as for the short run.
The reason is simply that (on the given assumptions) 
the same type of transaction would also occur to 
cure the long run ones. (68, page 67)
The other writers referred .to by Calabresi are Bramhall and
Mills who in criticizing a work by Kamien, Schwartz, and
Dolbear (66) point out that:
Under the payments scheme, profits will be larger 
than they would have been in the absence of inter­
vention and under the fee scheme profits will be 
smaller than in the absence of intervention. On 
the usual assumptions about entry and exit, entry 
will take place in the former case and exit in the 
latter case. Entry will lower the price of this 
product relative to prices of other products, and 
exit will raise it. Thus, relative prices will, 
in the long run, be different under the payments 
scheme than under the charges scheme. Since rela­
tive prices will differ, the choice between the 
two schemes is partly a matter of efficiency and 
not, as Kneese concludes, entirely a matter of 
equity. (66, pages 615 and 616)
Gifford and Stone (74) attempt to refute this argument by
pointing out that under the payments scheme, the payer will
only pay if its profits increase.
The problem with these arguments is that they do not
really answer the relevant question: Will firm entry lead
to inefficient results in externality situations where
bargaining is possible? The analysis of Gifford and Stone
is confined to the short run profit maximization of two
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firms and is ineffective for two reasons. First, their
bargaining model does not tell us how the number of firms in
each industry react to changes in the bargaining decision of
individual firms. Their statement that payment will be
forthcoming only if it is profitable may be the answer but
Gifford and Stone do not show why. Second, their bargaining
model, as an analysis of the short run actions of firms, is
not universal. Basically, they assume the result by not
1 Rtelling the reader how the bargainers actually bargain.
Various writers have addressed industry adjustments 
directly, though none have done so correctly. Tybout (7 2) 
and Schulze and d'Arge (74) all treat the industry size as 
a variable. However, because their definition of the exter­
nality problem is Pigovian rather than Coasian, their 
results are incorrect.
On the other hand, Nutter (68) followed by Shapiro 
(74) uses the correct definition of externality. Nutter 
points out that the important aspect in the cattle-wheat 
case of Coase is whether cattle will be raised on a plot 
of land adjoining wheat production. He recognizes the 
site-specific nature of the externality problem. The
18
Their model is only a description of two profit func­
tions which yield the joint profit maximizing results with­
out explicitly assuming a joint profit maximizing model.
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importance of rents on these plots is also recognized.
Cattle production will only occur next to wheat production, 
if the "cruasi-rents" associated with the two together are 
at least as great as alternative values of the land.
Nutter concludes his analysis with the statement that 
the necessary prior existence of rent assures the Coase 
Theorem. However, Nutter and later Shapiro do not recognize 
that the rent associated with the pollution generating 
activity is a variable that adjusts as the industry sizes 
adjust. As the rent adjusts it guides production toward 
the efficient solution. It is the competitive adjustment 
mechanism acting through these rents that is the focus of 
the proof of the Coase Theorem presented in Chapters V and 
VI.
Summary
The current externality literature pertaining to the 
Coase Theorem is incomplete. First, the Coase Theorem is 
not compatible in a theoretical sense with the Pigovian 
school even though they address the same problem. This is 
true even though proponents of both schools admit the valid­
ity of the other's arguments in limited circumstances. 
Second, the validity of the Coase Theorem when industry 
adjustments are considered stands under a theoretical cloud.
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The result of these two problems is that the importance and 
application of Coase's proposition cannot be fully appreci­
ated.
While there are many similar lines of analysis run­
ning through the externality literature there is none which 
completely integrates the various approaches. Such an 
outline is the first goal of this dissertation and is the 
purpose of the next chapter. As shown in later chapters, 
by combining the large/small numbers classification with 
the public/private reception dichotomy the arguments of 




The review of the literature shows that there are many 
ways of viewing externality problems. This chapter inte­
grates two of these. Specifically, the classification 
scheme of "large or small numbers" of externality affected 
parties is joined with the classification scheme of "public 
or private reception." This produces a fourfold outline of 
externality problems. From this outline the appropriate 
specifications of the externality can be deduced. These 
alternative specifications are used to derive Pareto welfare 
conditions that are consistent with the differing policy 
prescriptions of Pigou and Coase.
Consider the matrix in Table II-l.
TABLE II-l
OUTLINE OF EXTERNALITIES





The purpose of this chapter is to examine the taxonomy in 
Table II-l. This will be done by, first, analyzing indivi­
dually the classification schemes of large/small numbers 
and public/private reception. Attention is paid to the 
underlying assumptions in each. Then, the various types 
of externalities are discussed and illustrative examples 
are offered.
It will be shown in the following chapters that:
Type I is the case for which the unilateral Pigovian tax 
is appropriate; Type II requires a bilateral tax; Type III 
is the case developed by Coase in his path-breaking article; 
Type IV is probably unsolvable except by government regula­
tion. Together these four types effectively address all 
knov/n technological externality problems.
The Large/Small Numbers Classification
The distinction between large and small numbers is one 
based on transactions costs. In bargaining, there is a 
potential gain to any party from holding out, which, as the 
number of parties involved becomes large, results in prohi­
bitively high transactions costs. (This phenomenon is often 
called the "free rider" problem. ) The costs of negotiating
^Actually, there are many variations of the "free 
rider" concept. We use the term only as indicated above. 
Also, the term transactions costs is used in the sense of 
reaching a voluntary agreement where no formal market exists. 
In addition to the cost resulting from strategic behavior 
it includes the costs of decision making for each individual, 
administrative costs, etc.
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a voluntary solution will be a function of the number of 
parties affected. Thus, solutions to technological exter­
nality situations will in general depend on the number of 
participants. We define the small number case as one where 
these transaction costs are zero, and the large number case 
as one where they are infinite. Furthermore, it is assumed 
that while individual transactions costs are infinite in the 
large number case, the administrative costs of determining 
and imposing the perfect tax are zero.^ In practice, of 
course, these definitions are too strict.21 However, 
theoretically they allow the two extremes to be distin­
guished without cluttering the analysis with a measure of 
transactions cost.
2^In practice the result will always be that the margi­
nal cost of administering a tax and the marginal inefficiency 
of the tax mechanism employed must be compared to the marginal 
benefit of its imposition. This assumption merely allows 
us to use the theoretical concept of a tax as an alternative 
to the private action of individuals. For an important 
discussion of taxing methods see Johnson (69).
? 1Note that the free rider problem is not a problem that 
absolutely prohibits an efficient solution. Even in the case 
of the free rider problem in pure public goods, the optimal 
solution is definable and the political mechanism is avail­
able to overcome the inability of the market to achieve the 
Lindahl solution. The Wicksellian rule allows each person's 
small marginal effect to be important enough for the indivi­
dual to state his true preferences. The problem is that in 
the real world the costs of reaching this solution as the 
number of participants becomes large may be prohibitive. 
However, some research, notably V. Smith (73), show that 
the Wicksellian rule may be practicable.
2 /
The Public/Private Classification
Public externalities have the property that the recep­
tion by one firm does not diminish the amount potentially 
available to others. The definition is the same as that 
for public goods presented by Samuelson (54, 55). Per 
externalities this implies that the quantity of the spill­
over effect received by one firm is not affected by the 
number of other firms receiving the effects. This is the 
type of externality assumed by Baumol (72) in his classic 
factory-laundry example. It is also a common assumption 
of writers in the Pigovian tradition.
Formally we can write n^y^ = ^ 2 ' where n^ is the number 
of firms in the externality producing industry, y-, is the 
amount of the externality produced by each firm, and y 7 is 
the amount received by each firm in the receiving industry. 
This specification embodies the public reception character­
istics because the amount produced, n-^y^, is available for 
anyone to receive. The number of receiving firms, n 2 , does 
not affect the amount received by any one. The total amount 
received can, in this case, increase even if n^y-^ stays con­
stant. As the number of receivers, n 2 , increases the total 
reception increases.
Note that the measurement of the externality is in 
terms of the magnitude of the units received. There is no 
dispersion factor or distance factor, etc., included in the 
public externality. Clearly, this is a most simplified way 
of expressing the externality. The vagaries of weather and
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other factors are casually dismissed. This is done for two 
reasons. First, other writers have done this so it is con­
tinued here for comparability. Second, we are most con­
cerned with the distinction between public and private. A
public externality is one that is available at the same 
level to all receivers. A dispersion factor only compli­
cates this definition. For instance, if a dispersion factor 
is included and the externality is negative all receivers 
will move as far away as possible. If the pollution is 
received at all it will be received at the minimum level by
all firms. The opposite occurs for positive externalities.
Thus, the specification y 2 = n 2_Y]_f though simplified, is 
appropriate for public externalities. The level n^y-^ is 
defined in the same dimension as y 2 merely for convenience.
Private externalities are such that the amount received 
by one firm does reduce the amount available to others.
There are two situations that give rise to a private exter­
nality. The simple case is one where the amount received 
by one firm actually removes externality units from the 
amount available to others. This situation can be written 
as n 2_Yj_ = n 2^2' T^e amount received by one firm is an in­
verse function of the total number of receiving firms, n2< 
The total amount received is constrained to n^y^. In 
terms of the specification of the externality this situation 
is identical to a normal market sale of an input by one 
industry to another.
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The other situation that causes the externality to be 
private is that of locational restriction of the external 
effects. In some cases, externality effects can be consid­
ered to be spacially bounded. The production of an exter­
nality at one point spills forth with diminishing impact as 
it moves away from the origin. For simplicity, assume that 
the externality is produced in one area, completely fills 
that area with equal intensity but does not cross over into 
the next area. Thus, the externality is locationally con­
fined. The importance of this assumption is that the maxi­
mum number of firms receiving the externality in one area 
will be fixed if spatial requirements of firms are positive. 
In the simplest case, the maximum number is one; the exter­
nality is then "one-on-one.” Mhere the number of potential 
receivers is limited, scarcity of the locations will cause 
the externality to be private.
Strictly speaking the maximum number of firms in a 
given area is not fixed. One need only look at the acres of 
beach and number of hotel rooms in Miami now compared to 100 
years ago to find evidence of this. Both are functions of 
market price. However, for simplicity, it is assumed that 
locations are perfectly inelastically supplied in a given 
area and that firms require a fixed amount of space. Thus, 
the maximum number of firms in any area is fixed.
In the one-on-one case of locational confinement of the 
spillover, the externality specification is simply y^ = y . 
The amount produced by one firm is identical to that
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received by another. Only one firm can receive the effects. 
Locational restriction of the spillover effects can occur in 
the large number case by modifying the assumption of "one- 
on-one" association. For instance, y-^  >_ I<y2 says that the 
amount of the externality produced by one firm can be
9 2
received by up to X firms.”
If the externality is negative there must be a binding 
constraint on the number of locations for pollution to 
exist at all. With no limit on locations externality 
receiving firms would always avoid pollution.
The Various Externality Types
Type I externalities are large number, public recep­
tion cases. This is the type implicitly assumed by Baumol 
in the factory-laundry example. Embodied in this classic 
example is the assumption that there is such a large number 
of producers and receivers that bargaining is prohibited. 
Furthermore, the reception of the effects by one laundry 
has no effect on the quality of the air and, hence, does 
not effect the amount of the externality available to 
others. Baumol does not consider the scarcity of loca­
tions within the polluted area. The implicit assumption 
is that the number of firms receiving the pollution is 
unconstrained.
2 2It should be noted that if K is defined as the 
maximum number of firms in a given area, the externality 
is private only if n£ > K.
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Type II externalities are characterized by large number 
and private reception. As noted above, there are two pos­
sible causes of the private externality: scarcity of the
externality itself or scarcity of locations to receive it.
In the estuaries of the southeastern United States, small 
shrimp grow to nearly commercial size before returning to 
the ocean where they are harvested. Commercial activities 
in the estuaries affect the amount of shrimp leaving. The 
external effects are of the large number type because of 
the many lease holders of the marsh and the many shrimpers. 
The externality is private because each shrimp caught is 
one fewer to be caught by others. Scarcity of locations 
may be a constraint here due to congestion.
An alternative example of Type II externalities, one
7 7embodying locational restriction, is that of bees. The 
case of bees can be large number or small number, but it 
is always private. The pollination provided by a swarm 
is only occurring in the group of trees within the area of 
the swarm. If the swarm occurs over a large enough area, 
the externality might be of the large number variety.
Because locational confinement of a spillover causes 
it to be private, any externality affecting firms that 
have a plant with large spatial requirements must be
23The bees and apples externality comes rrom Meade 
(52). Assume the externality is a positive one where bee 
keeping affects the growth of fruit as well as producing 
honey. We will not consider the bilateral possibilities 
of this problem, i.e., fruit growing affecting the quantity 
of honey.
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private. For instance, Baumol's example of the factory- 
laundry is best analyzed as a private externality. Thus, 
in terms of producers, a realistic example of a purely 
public externality is hard to find. Hov/ever, for consumer 
cases the aesthetic deterioration of tourist areas con­
forms to the Type I definition.
Type III externalities exist when the number of parties 
is small enough to facilitate bargaining. This type may 
exist due to privateness generated by locational restric­
tion or by quantity reduction of the externality due to 
reception. However, the site-specific nature of the 
external effects seems to exist even in this latter case. 
Thus, Type III is always modeled as a locationally con­
fined externality problem. Bees are a good example. The 
number of trees in the area of the swarm will affect the 
number of trees covered by the swarm. If the area of the 
swarm is small, the externality is Type III simply for 
this reason. Noise is a good example of pure locational 
confinement. Even though the noise is available at a con­
stant level to all in the immediate area, the immediate
24area is limited and so is the externality.
Note that in the case of noise we have an example 
of dispersion associated with multiple locations receiv­
ing exactly the same level of the externality. Noise can 
be thought of as emanating from a point and moving out in 
concentric circles of decreasing decibel levels. Dis­
missing the dispersion factor in the one-on-one case assumes 
that the single reception site is all of the surrounding 
area from origin to the point where the noise is indis­
tinguishable .
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Finally, for Type IV externalities to exist, it is 
necessary that a small number of firms receive an exter­
nality publicly. This means that there must be an unlimited 
number of firms which could receive the effects, but that in 
practice the number will be small enough to facilitate bar­
gaining. Type IV externalities are not analysed in this 
paper.
Summary
This chapter has introduced and discussed the three­
fold outline of externalities used in the remaining 
chapters. Actually, the outline includes four types but 
the last type is not important in terms of the reconcili­
ation of the Pigovian and Coasian traditions.
The logical flow of the argument pursued in this 
research is to develop a taxonomy that includes all known 
classes of externalities. For the classes outlined by 
this taxonomy, the alternative externality specifications 
are then developed. Using these specifications, the Pareto 
conditions are derived and are compared to the policy pre­
scriptions of Pigou and Coase. This chapter has addressed 
the first two points in this procedure: the taxonomy
has been presented and the externality specifications 
discussed.
Type I and III externalities offer unique specifi­
cations of the spillover effects that are consistent with 
the catagories from which they are drawn. For Type I,
^ 2 ~ nl^l exPresses the public reception. The large
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number aspect has no affect on the externality identity.
For Type III, y^ = Y 2 embodies both the strict one-on- 
one locational confinement of the externality and the 
small number requirement.
Type III externalities have two specifications because 
there are two possible causes of privateness of exter­
nality reception. First, an actual reduction in the 
quantity of the externality may result from the reception 
by one firm. This can be modeled as n-^y^ = ^ 2 ^ 0 - In tlie 
specification this case is identical to a normal market 
input. It is an externality because of some market fail­
ure, for instance, a common access resource. Alternatively, 
the externality may be Type II because its effects are 
locationally confined. This specification in the large 
number case is y-^  _> Ky 2 * The only difference between 
this and a Type III externality is that the number K is 
assumed large enough to prohibit bargaining.
CHAPTER III
THE MATURE OF EXTERNALITY AND EFFICIENCY 
Introduction
As previously stated, the main goal of this paper is 
to reconcile the Pigovian and Coasian approaches to the 
externality problem. It was suggested in Chapter II that 
the four type taxonomy of externalities based on the 
large/small number and public/private reception classifi­
cation schemes could be used to reconcile these two schools. 
In order to do so, it is necessary to derive the Pareto 
welfare conditions for an economy constrained by exter­
nality problems of these various types. In other words, 
by using the technical definitions of the aggregate exter­
nality developed in the last chapter, we should be able 
to generate both Pigou's policy prescriptions as well as 
Coase's .
This chapter first defines externality production and 
reception and states the assumptions about the production 
functions used in this research. Second, a Pareto welfare 
model is devised that includes externality constraints
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consistent with the definition of Types I, II, and III.
25Finally, the resulting Pareto conditions are discussed.
Before beginning the analysis, a few words about the 
general assumptions governing the model are in order. 
Throughout, only competitive industries are considered.
No discussion of any monopoly or otherwise imperfectly 
competitive situations is undertaken. All firms in an 
industry are identical and possess U-shaped cost curves 
so that the number of firms is determinate at the compe­
titive equilibrium. The competitive equilibrium is assumed 
to exist. Moreover, resources are assumed to be perfectly 
mobile at zero cost. This assumption has the special 
application to the relocation of firms in those cases 
where the externality is site specific. As stated before, 
in tnose cases where bargaining costs are assumed zero 
(the small number case) all possible transactions are 
included.
Externality Production
In the production of externalities the quantity of 
output and the quantity of the externality are treated as 
joint products of the application of some set of resources.
9 S"Actually the Pareto conditions for Type III exter­
nalities -will not appear at this point to be completely 
representative of Coase's arguments. This relationship 
is developed in Chapters IV and V.
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■ °6Consider the following implicit production function 
for the externality producer:
f 1 ( q 1 ,  y±' K i' * • • '  x n ) =  0 
In this production function, "q^" is the normal output of
the firm, "y-j_" is the amount of the e x t e r n a l i t y  produced,
and "x^, . . ., xn " are the amounts of the inputs one through
n. Ignoring any effects on y^, we assume that f 1!*) is
such that 3q-^/3x^ follows the normal assumptions of increas-
27ing and then decreasing returns for all i = 1 . . .n.
This assumption generates the normal U-shaped short run 
cost curves.
The simplest relationship between q^ and v , can be
found by taking the total differential of the production
function, dividing through by dq^, and setting all dx^/dq
equal to zero. This yields:
1) 3y /3q = “f V f 1
i l  q y
The sign of - f 1/ f 1 is assumed to be non-negative. If the
q y
sign of this term is positive, it implies that an increase
0 i~<.
Whitcomb (72) has argued that the production function 
specification used here offers too many degrees of freedom.
He claims the appropriate specification for the externality 
producing firm is
q = f (xx , . . . , xn)
y = h (x-j_, . . . , xn)
This specification does not allow for a tradeoff between q 
and y holding all Xj_ constant. However, as shown in the 
text, the more general specification includes his case and 
yields the same results.
27This assumption is made for both producers and receivers 
of externalities. Hence, the convexity of the production 
constraints for the economy is assured at the point of com­
petitive equilibrium.
9 o
in increases while holding all x c o n s t a n t . I f
- f V f 1 is zero, the good and externality are fixed pro- 
q Y
portion joint products. The constrained profit function
of a firm which faces the prices {P , P , P., i=l • . .n}
<5 y x
9 n
for its output, externality" and inputs, respectively, is:
7T = P cr + P v - ZR x + d)f1 (a. , y , x. , . . . , x ) 
q*l y* 1 i i i - 1 1 1  n
Profit maximizing conditions imply the following:
i = 1 . . . n .
The profit maximizing firm producing an externality 
for which it confronts a marginal price (positive or nega­
tive) will sum the marginal revenue products of the output 
and externality and set this equal to the price of each 
input. If we simplify the analysis at this point by con­
sidering only one input, the terms 3a /3x. and 3y./3x.
“X l  X 2.
in Equation 1 become dq^/dx^ and dy /dx^. Rewriting, we 
have
P = R/(dq /dx ) - P (dy /dq )
h i i  y i l
where P. is the price of the single input. The tern
R/(dq./dx ) is the marginal cost of output; P,(dy /dq ) 
i l  y l -1
is the value an incremental unit of q^ has through its
9 o
Air pollution produced by cars tends to exhibit 
this property. The timing advance can be changed decreasing 
pollution as well as output (miles per gallon) .
2 9P may be considered to be a tax, a subsicy, or a 
bribe paicl by another firm.
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effect on y^. If y^ is a negative externality and the firm 
is forced to pay the marginal cost of this pollution,
y
would be negative. The term -P (dy / d a  ) would shift up
y i i
the marginal cost curve of the firm forcing a lower level of 
production of q . This shift is shown in Figure III-l.
Externality Reception
The characteristics of the effect of the externality 
on the receiving firm are the same as any other input, 
except that the effect may be either to decrease or to 
increase output depending on the sign of the externality.
We may write the general production function for the 
receiving firm as:
f 2 ( q 2 '  Y 2 ' x i '  • • • '  x n ^  =  0 •
The term "q-," is the output of the firm; "x-, , . .- 1 n
are the normal inputs; "y9" is the quantity of the exter­
nality received from some other firm. As indicated the 
effects of the externality are treated like another input 
in the function f2 (-). Because there is only one output, 
f2 (*) can be written in explicit form,33 i.e., 
q n - F 2 (y9 , x^, . . ., x ) = f2 (-).
The partial of f 2 (*) with respect to each x^ is 
assumed to follow the normal assumptions of increasing and 
then decreasing returns. The sign of the term 3q2/3y2 = 
-f2/f2 defines the type of externality, positive or negative.
y i
^ T h e  implicit production function form is used only 









If 9q2/3y2 i-s zero, no relevant externality exists at thai
point. It is assumed that 32q0/3y 2 < 0 for positive ^ z
o 1
externalities and > 0 for negative externalities. The 
constrained profit function of the externality receiving 
firm where y is unpriced and where the firm has no con- 
trol over v n :
^  =  pqq2 “  S R j_x i  +  Z(q2' '12 ' x i '  * ' * '  '
Because 3tt/3v 2 = ^~y' anc  ^  ^ = ~'Pc//^ cr' v/e that 3r/3y2 =
Pq 3q7/3y^. As expected, the marginal value of (its
effect on profits) is the rate at which it increases
output measured in terms of the price of output.
The term 3x./3vn is assumed to be zero for all i=l... i * z
n. The externality will either increase or decrease the 
output of q^ holding the other inputs constant but it will
31Although there are many other ways of looking at 
the effect of the externality (especially in terms of 
shifts in the cost curves), these will not be important 
for later derivations and are dismissed here. For dis­
cussions of the issue of separability see, e.g., Davis 
and Whinston (6 2) and Dusansky and Kalman (72) .
32Because we treat the receiving firm as unable to 
directly control the quantity of the externality, it is 




not affect the quantity of the other inputs. This 
treatment is consistent with the notion that the exter­
nality is treated simply as another input, albeit one over 
which the firm may have no control.
The Model
The purpose of the Pareto welfare models presented 
in this chapter is to derive the efficiency conditions 
for Type I, II, and III externalities. The specification 
of the aggregate externality constraint forms the dif­
ference between the three models and, hence, constitutes 
the difference in the efficiency conditions.
3 3The limitation of treating the externality such that 
its effect is only felt on output is that it may be more 
realistic to hypothesise that one or more of the inputs are 
the media for the introduction of the externality. In this 
case 3y 2/ 3xj_ may not be zero for some i=I...n. If we assume 
that 9y 2 / 3xy is greater than zero for some i, then the 
result is that more of the resource is used if f£/f,?f is 
positive and less is used if the externality is negative.
Another possible assumption might be that the exter­
nality affects the quantity of one of the resources, where 
the resource is measured in efficiency units. If 3 xy/ 3y 2 
is not equal to zero the effect shows up as an increased 
value of d n / d y ? . Where previously the value of y 2 was the 
value of the direct effect of Y 2 on 0 3 , it now includes 
both this effect and the value of the marginal product of 
the ith resource times 9 xj_/3 y 2 . In other words, if the 
externality is positive, not only will it increase q 2 itself, 
but it will also increase the efficiency units of x^ and 
thereby increase q 2 .
We do not consider these last two amendments to the 
assumptions concerning the production function of the exter­
nality receiving firm because first, they are not directly 
associated with the objectives of this research; and 
second, they would involve much more elaborate derivations 
later in this chapter.
Production
Consider two industries composed of n^ and n? firms 
respectively. Industry one is the externality producing 
industry; industry two is the receiving industry. Thus, 
the externality is one way. Firms in the same industry 
are identical in terms of their production functions and 
purely competitive in terms of their behavior. Industry 
output is equal to the number of firms in the industry 
times the output of a firm. Assuming only one input, 
production functions for representative firms of each 
industry are shown in Equation Set 3.
3) f M q ^  y-^ , xx) = 0, and f2 (q9, y v  x^) = o
These production functions are assumed to be convex in 
the region of welfare maximization.^
The specification of the aggregate externality identi­
ties was developed in Chapter II. The aggregate amount of 
the externality produced and received in the Type I case 
(large number, public reception) can be expressed as 
n-,y = y . The aggregate externality identity for exter- 
nalities of Type II (large number, private reception) 
is n-^y^ = n 2 l2 w'-ere externality is private because
the quantity of the externality is reduced by reception.
For Type III externalities (private reception, small
■^^This assumption is no stronger than assuming the 
existence of a competitive equilibrium given the previous 
assumptions made about the production functions.
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number) the specification is simply that the externality 
produced by a firm in industry one is necessarily received 
by one and only one firm in industry two, i.e., y^ = y?.
Type II externalities that are private because of the 
locational confinement of the spillover will be analysed
n —
by means of the model used for Type III externalities.^
In these specifications, it is assumed that all firms 
produce and receive the external effects. Some writers, 
notably 3aumol (72), allow for the externality to be
avoided. However, the results are predictable for Type
I externalities. The interested reader is directed to 
Baumol's paper. For the locationallv confined exter­
nality, avoidance is an important consi ci02Tci tion / one* 
addressed in depth in Chapters IV and V.
An additional constraint must be included to ensure
that in the case of negative spillovers the Type III 
externality exists. The number of firms in each industry 
is assumed to be equal and limited. That is, n-, = n ? = S,
-^Recall the externality specification in this case: 
yi _> Ky 2 * Pareto optimality will require this constraint 
to be solved as an equality. K is a constant and can be 
omitted from explicit consideration.
O r
The concern in this chapter is with the Pareto con­
ditions on the firms receiving and producing the external­
ity. The assumption that all firms in the two industries 
are externality related is a simple method of addressing 
only this point. The inclusion of an upper limit, 3, on 
the number of firms in each industry is done for logical 
consistency in the negative externality case. In the 
positive externality case, firms in the two industries will 
seek to locate near one another. However, in this case the 
constraint on the maximum number of firms may be lifted.
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where S is the fixed number of firms in each industry. A
negative Type III externality will only exist if alternative
locations are not available. If available, alternative
locations would allow the potential pollution receiving
firms to avoid the externality. Given a sufficient number
of such locations, no firm in industry two would receive 
37pollution.
Consumption
Assume there are L consumers in the economy who do
not experience directly the pollution. The utility function 
t hof the j consumer can be specified as:
U 3 = U^IQ^, Q 2j, x 3j)
t hwhere is the amount of the i good consumed by
individual j, and "x 3 j" is the amount of the resources, X, 
consumed. The constrained utility function of consumer 
j is :
U 3 = U 3 ( •) - X . (P, Q, . + PnQ n . - P J x , .  - x v ) c u 1 1 ]  2 2j 3 3] 3j
where "x 3 j" is the initial endowment of the resource to
■V Vi
the j consumer, "P-^," "P 2 /M anc^  "^3 " are the market 
prices of Q^, Q2 , and X, respectively, that are faced
37 It is this aspect of the Type III case that is 
most important in interpreting the results of this research 
vis-a-vis the results of other writers.
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thparametrically by the j consumer, and A is the 
Lagrangian multiplier on the income constraint. By maxi­
mizing this function, we obtain the familiar result that
U = A . P . , i = 1, 3.
1 3 1
For the economy, it must be true that
Q . = ZQ . . , i = 1, 2 1 . 1 1
3 J
and
X = Zx., , = n, x, + n„x_ + Ex, . • 3i k k 2 2 • 3i
J J 3
Pareto Optimality
The large number, public reception externality model,
which will henceforth be named Model I, has the following
3 8constrained Pareto welfare function:
n = I 0). (U3 (.) - g )
j
+ Z y .n.f1 *-) ^ x x
+ Z p.(n.q. - Z Q . •) ^ 1 i x  j 13
+ o„ (X - Z n.x. - Zx, .) ■ 3 . ! 1 33
+ i/j (n1 y 1 - y2) i = l, 2 ; j  = l, l
3 8
The terms to j , yj_, p, and ip are Lagrangian multipliers,
Because all firms xn each industry are identical, n-j_fi(>) =
y;ni fx (. )  ^ where n. denotes the number of firms in the i^h
3 = 1 1
industry.
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t hThe term "g^" is the utility constraint of the j consumer
in accordance with definition of Pareto welfare.
By replacing the last constraint, the externality 
identity, with ^(n-^y^ - n 2 y 2) , we have the Pareto welfare 
function for large number, private externalities which are 
not locationally confined (Model II). Finally, Model III 
requires the substitution of <My^ ~ Y 2  ^ + 1>(S - n) for the 
last constraint and n for n^ and n 2 elsewhere in the equa­
tion. Privately received, large number externalities that
are locationally confined can be analyzed by means of Model
III.
In order to derive the first order conditions of
Pareto optimality, the function is maximized L times each
time setting a different equal to one and g^ equal to
zero. This generates a system of L(4L + 13) equations
for Model I. All L sets of these equations are similar
in form; the value of the equations may be different and,
hence a simultaneous solution is necessary to achieve
39Pareto optimality. Maximizing the system for a typical 
consumer (holding all other consumers' utility constant 
and satisfying all constraints exactly) yields the following 
set of equations. These equations are essentially the same 
except for the partials with respect to industry size.
Hence, the derivations are carried out for Model I only.
~^See cliff Lloyd (67, page 252) . The use of Wj and g. 
to simplify the welfare maximization derivations comes from-1 
Baumol (72). Specifications similar to the one used here 
can be found in Schulze and d'Arge (74), Howrey and Quandt 
(6 8 ), and Myers and Weintraub (71), especially with regard 
to the industry size and welfare maximization techniques.
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4) 3fi/3s. = co . U . - p. = 0 i = 1, 3, j = 1, Ll j i l
t h  iwhere = i argument in U J (•)
5) 3fl/3q. = ii.n.f1 + p.n. = 0 i = 1, 2' ^i l l q l l
6 ) 3fl/3y^ = u^n^f^ + = 0
7) 3fi/3y2 = u 2 n 2 f^ - = 0
8 ) 3fi/3x. = p.n.f1 - p^n. =i l l x 3 l
9) 3fi/3n1 = P1q1 + '^ y1 - P3xj_ + p-Lf1 (-) = 0
2
10) 3fi/3n2 = P2^2 “ P3X 2 + 1J2f ^  = ®
Because all L sets of equations are similar in form,
it'can be shown that the Pareto requirements on price in
the two industries hold in general and are not affected
40by the income distribution. Moreover, because the supply 
and demand functions of consumers and firms are homo­
geneous of degree zero with respect to the prices of good 
one, good two, and the resource (i.e., P^, P2 , P^) accord­
ing to Walras' Law, the specification of any one uniquely
40This means that m  the derivations to come, the choice 
of the u)j=l and gj = 0 will not affect the Pareto requirements. 
In fact, the same results are implicitly derived L times.
This does not mean that the Pareto "solution" is invariant 
with respect to the distribution of income, nor will relative 
prices be. Relative prices and the composition of consump­
tion will be invariant with respect to the distribution 
of factor endowments or income if and only if all pre­
ference functions are identically homothetic. See 
Samuelson (58).
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determines the other two. Hence, fixing the price of the 
resource allows us to determine P^ and P2 *
Substituting the ok term into the first order con­
ditions for utility maximization by the L consumers, we 
have that
11) oj.U-? = co.A.P., i = 1, 3, j = 1, L.
3 1  3 3 i J
Combining Equations 11 and 4 we have
12) p. = co . U ■? = co ■ A . P . , i =  1, 3, j = 1, L .
l 3 1  j j i
From Equations 5 and 8
p 3 = ~Pi (f f g) / i = 1 , 2
Substituting for f^/f^j
p 3 = Pj_(dq^/dx^ + (fy/fg) ( d y ^ d x ^  } , i = 1, 2
Solving for the term f^/f^ from Equations 5, 6 , and 7
fVf1 = -[ ( p0 n_) /p, ] f 2/f 2y q L 'K 2 2 /MlJ y  <3
2
Noting that dy 2 /dx2 = 0 and f = 1 by definition (see page 
III-6 ) we have
2
13) p3 = p1 (dq1 /dx1) - p2 n 2 fy (dy1 /dx1)
14) p3 = p2 (dq2 /dx9)
Substituting {'ijAjP^, i = 1, 3} from Equation 12 for
50
{p^, i = 1, 3}, cancelling u k A^, and rewriting
15) = P 3 /(dq1 /dx1) + P2n2fy (dy1 /dq1)
16) P2 = P 3 /(dq2 /dx2)
Substituting for \jj and for {p^, i = 1, 3} in Equations 9 
and 19, and cancelling
17) Plq l ~ (P2n2fy)yl = P3X 1
18) p 2 q 2 = P3X 2
Equations 15 and 16 can be interpreted as the mar­
ginal cost-price equality necessary to achieve Pareto 
optimality. Equations 17 and 18 are the zero profits 
conditions that ensure the appropriate number of firms 
in each industry and thereby specify the point in the 
marginal cost curve that yields Pareto optimality.
Equations 17 and 18 can be written in average cost form.
The derivation of the Pareto conditions for Model II 
require that the constraint if;(n^ y^  - n 7 y7) be substituted 
for 4j(n-^y^ - y2) . Equations 7 and 10 are changed to
T )  U2n 2fy - 1'n 2 = 0
2
10') p2q2 - (j;y2 - p3x 2 + u2f (•) = 0
This change in Equation 7 causes the n 2 term in Equations
13, 15, and 17 to fall out. The change in Equation 10 
2
causes (p 2^y^yl to aPPear on t*10 left-hand-side of Equation
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18. Thus, the extra term {P2 ( 3<32/ 9y2 )(Y2 /q2)^ appears in 
Table III-l, under the average cost conditions for industry 
two.
For Model III iMy^ ” Y2) substituted for ip (n-^y^ - y 2) 
and "n" is substituted for n^ and n2> The additional con­
straint ip (S-n) is necessary for consistency. Equations 6 
and 7 become
6 ") u nf 1 + i = 0 .
1 y r
7 " ) l-unf2 - ip = 0 .
2 y
Because n now appears in both Equations 6 " and 7" it can­
cels and Equations 13 and 15 are the same in Model II. 
Equations 9 and 10 become simply
2 2
9") P1q 1 + P2q 2 " P3X 1 ~ P3X 2 + y lf + y 2 f +
= 0 .
The value of the Lagrangian multiplier <p is the imputed
value of the scarce locations n, in Model III.
Table III-l summarizes these conditions for all three 
41models. Recall that Type I is the Pigovian case and Type 
III is the Coasian case. However, the marginal cost con­
ditions in all three models are essentially identical. It 
is the average cost requirements that delineate the dif­
ferences in the results.
The equation numbers from th,e text are shown in 
parentheses in the table.
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Table III-l
Pareto Efficiency Conditions for 
Externalities of Type I, II, and III
Model I 





15) P1 = p 3/(dq1 /dx1) 16) P 2 = P 3/(dq 2/dx2)
-P 2 n 2 (3q2 /9y2) ( d y ^ d q ^
18) P.
p 2 n 2 O q 2/3y2) (y^/^)







P1 = P 3/' (dcli/d x i) 
- P 2 ( d q 2/ d y 2 ) (dy1 /dq1)
P1 = P 3Xl;/ql
Industry Two 
P 2 = p 3/(d(39/dx2)
P2 P3 X 2 //q2.







Px = P 3/(dq1 /dx1)
-P 2 (3.q2/3 y2) (dy1 /dq1)
P1 = P 3Xl/gl 
+(0-(P2 q 2 - P 3x 2))/qi
Industry Two 
P 2 = P 3'/ (d % 2 /'d x 2^
P 2 = P 3X 2/q2 
+(0 -(P1 q 1 - P 3x 1 ))/q2
*This condition is best stated as a zero profits requiremen
. E, (P . q . - P 0x.) i=lv l^i 3 i 0 = 0 ,  where 0 is imputed rent on each locati<
53
The marginal cost conditions in all three models show 
that the externality producing industry should explicitly 
recognize the effect of the externality and the receiving 
industry should merely take the externality as a given.
For industry one, marginal cost of q^ should be the addi­
tional cost of the resource necessary to produce an addi­
tional unit of plus the additional cost of producing q ^ 
caused by an additional unit of q-^ . In Model I, P^/(dq^/dx^) 
is the additional cost of the resource; ~ ^ 2 n 2 (^ 2 //^ 2  ^
(dy^/dq^) is the additional cost imposed on the production 
of q 2 » For industry two, there is no explicit accounting 
for the effect of the externality. (dq2 /dx2 ) is the 
additional cost of the resource necessary to produce an 
additional unit.of q 2 • However, the term (dq2 /dx2  ^
implicitly reflects the effect of the externality, as dis­
cussed in the third section of this chapter.
The average cost conditions for the three models 
differ significantly. In Model I, firms in the external­
ity producing industry must, in their average cost, explic­
itly account for the effect of the externality on the
42
receiving industry. The "price"* of the externality is 
the term -P2 n2 ( <^2 /  ^’ T^is term times the amount of 
the externality should be an actual payment made by each 
firm in industry one if a Pigovian tax is used to achieve 
optimality. On the other hand, no explicit accounting
42
This price is positive or negative depending on the 
negative or positive sign of the externality, (dq2 /dy 2 ).
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should be made by the firms in industry two. To para­
phrase Baumol (72, page 312), the level of the exter­
nality acting through the marginal and average costs of 
the firms will optimally delimit the number of firms in 
the receiving industry. Hence, the results of Model I 
are consistent with the Pigovian taxing strictures dis­
cussed by Baumol.
Alternatively, Model II shows a case where the 
externality receiving industry must account explicitly 
for the externality. The term P 2 (3q2 /3y2) appears in 
the average cost requirements of both the producing and 
receiving firms. This term times the amount of the exter­
nality for each firm and summed over all the firms in 
each industry constitutes a transfer from one industry to 
the other; i.e., n^(P9 (3q2 /3y 2 )y^) = n 0 (P2 (3q2 /3y2 )y 2) 
because n^y^ = n 2 ^ 2 ’ T^e direction the transfer depends 
on the sign of the externality. If the externality is 
negative, industry one pays industry two; if positive, 
industry two pays industry one. This result is identical 
to the case of a normal good that is produced as a joint 
product and used as an input in another production process. 
This result is consistent with the Pigovian tax strictures 
suggested by Meade and Gould. Recall that Meade argued 
that a tax and subsidy scheme was necessary as opposed to 
a unilateral tax (assuming a negative externality) .
In Models I and II the average cost condition deter­
mines how many firms should exist in each industry. The
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average cost conditions determines where along the appro­
priately specified marginal cost curve each firm should 
operate.- Industry quantity demanded divided by the quantity 
produced by one firm yields the optimal industry size in 
terms of the number of firms.
In Model III industry size in the sense of the number 
of firms is fixed at S. This specification is used because 
pollution will not exist otherwise. Thus, the average cost 
conditions are not important in determining the number of 
firms.
While the average cost conditions for Model III are 
unimportant as a condition of efficiency, they are descrip­
tive about the nature of the Coasian externality problem. 
These average cost conditions states together as a zero
profit constraint show the value of as the rent on each
2
location. These conditions are best stated as I (P.q. -
i=l 1 1
P 3x i) = (p. If the marginal cost conditions are satisfied, 
and if the location constraint is binding, (n = S), the rent 
is a residual. The value of i is the value of the increase 
in welfare if S were increased. Its monetary value can be 
computed by taking the difference between the total 
revenues and resource cost for both the externality pro­
ducing and receiving firms at one location where the mar­
ginal conditions are satisfied.
It will be shown in Chapter V that the marginal cost 
conditions from Model III imply that the two firms must 
jointly maximize profit. If pollution cannot be avoided,
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the average cost efficiency conditions show that the two 
involved firms make profit equal to cp. If they are auto­
nomous, as Coase illustrated, it matters not which one has 
the property right to pollution because a rent, i, must 
exist. A payment can flow in either direction without 
affecting efficiency. However, Model III does not do 
justice to the Coasian case because the externality speci­
fication assumes that pollution must occur if production 
does. Results consistent with the Coasian case are only 
achieved if the location constraint is binding.
If a Type II externality exists because the number 
of locations is fixed, the efficiency conditions are given 
by Model III. The full implication of these results 
will be explored in Chapter V. However, the implication 
from the results obtained thusfar indicates that both the 
pollution receiver and producer should pay. Notice that 
such a tax scheme is not part of the Pigovian tradition.
In fact Baumol makes a point of criticizing Coase's sug­
gestion that possibly such a tax might be necessary. Coase 
and Buchanan both thought that such a tax might be appro­
priate but were unsure.
The reader may wonder whether a positive payment is 
always possible in either direction. This is a question of 
the possibility of corner solutions. Such questions are 
extensively addressed in the next two chapters. As a pre­
view, it can be shown that the payment will always equal 
the difference between total revenues and resource cost 
for the firm making the payment.
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Summary
This chapter has defined the externality problem in 
terms of the specification of the production functions of 
the firms in the economy. For simplicity only a one way 
externality is considered: firms either produce or receive
external effects. For the producing firm, the externality 
is a joint product of its output; for the receiving firm, 
the externality is like another input except that the firm 
may not be able to control the amount.
In order to consider the aggregate effect of the exter­
nality, three models were used. These models are specified 
in such a way as to conform to the definitions of Type I,
II, and III externalities. The Pareto welfare conditions 
of these models were derived and shown to conform with the 
policy suggestions of both the Pigovian and Coasian 
traditions.
Models I and II show results consistent with those of 
Baumol, Meade, and Gould. The imposition of a Pigovian tax 
is an appropriate technique for achieving efficiency. The 
tax differs in the two cases. In Model I such a tax should 
be unilateral; in Model II a tax/subsidy scheme is neces­
sary.
The welfare conditions derived from Model III can be 
shown to imply that profit maximization alone will achieve 
optimality. A negative externality will only exist if 
locations are scarce. This scarcity calls for a rent that 
means a payment between two autonomous firms can go in
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either direction. This result is consistent with Coase's 
arguments. This result also implies that the appropriate 
tax in the large number case where the externality is 
locationally confined is one where all parties pay.
In the following chapters, Model III will be amended 
to more closely reflect the conditions of the Coasian 
externality problem. Specifically, the model is extended 
to allow for the existence or avoidance of pollution at 
any particular site. With this extended model it will be 
shown how the rents, which are the essence of the Coasian 




IN THE SMALL NUMBER, PRIVATE RECEPTION CASE
Introduction
The results of the previous chapter indicate that the 
Pigovian and Coasian arguments can be reconciled. The 
Pareto conditions of Model I and II are appropriate for 
certain kinds of Pigovian problems; the taxing policies 
are consistent with those proposed by other writers. Model 
III shows results which, although simplified, are appro­
priate when locational restriction of the external effects 
occurs. This chapter extends the analysis of site-specific 
externalities by allowing for the externality to be avoided 
at some locations. The extension of the analysis to 
include the existence of pollution at some locations and 
not at others greatly increases the application of the 
model.
The site-specific externality analyzed by Model III 
gave rise to the Pareto welfare result that economic 
rents exist if locations are scarce. This finding has 
immediate policy implications that are consistent with the 
Coase Theorem. Specifically, these policy implications 
are: 1 ) government intervention is not necessarily when
technological externalities exist if the firms maximize
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profit; 2 ) definitions of property rights will only decide 
the payments going to various landlords and will not affect 
the quantity or mix of production; and, 3) the property 
right definition that occurs through governmental inaction 
is as efficient as any other; Pareto optimality is achieved 
even if property rights are given by defalut to the pol­
luter through government inaction. If the Coase Theorem 
is true, government interest in defining property rights 
is justified only when equity is a concern.
The results obtained from Model III in the last
chapter show that a shadow price on each location is
44
necessary when locations are scarce. This shadow price
has the economic interpretation of a rent. The proof of
the Coase Theorem hinges on two points. First, this econo-
4 5mic rent must exist m  the case of pollution. Second, ' 
the rent at each location is a variable. It changes as 
the industry output levels vary. This second point is the 
key to the Coase Theorem ignored by the current litera­
ture .
In order to develop the proof of the Coase Theorem, 
this chapter reexamines the Pareto efficiency conditions 
for Coasian externality problems. The constraint on
44 In other words, where the constraint on the maximum 
number of locations is binding.
45We are for the most part concerned only with nega­
tive externalities. When the theory is fully developed 
for these, the case of positive externalities becomes 
transparent.
locations is modified to allow for pollution at some loca- . 
tions and not at others. This modification brings the model 
more in line with the examples and applications of the 
theorem used by Coase and others. In many of the Type III 
externality cases one finds that firms in the industries 
involved in the externality do not always locate near 
one another. In other words, some firms avoid the pol­
lution problem while others are not so lucky. This chapter 
expands the welfare model to include this phenomenon and 
derives the Pareto conditions. In the next chapter the 
competitive mechanism is shown to generate these effi­
ciency properties.
The Relevance of the Small Number Setting
The small number case of externality relationships is 
relevant whenever participants can reach a mutually bene­
ficial solution to the spillover problem if such a solution 
exists. Coase (60) describes several examples that are 
consistent with the definition of the Type III externality. 
The confectioner versus the doctor, the cocoa-nut fibre 
weaver versus the sulphate of ammonia producer, and a 
brewer versus an innkeeper are all cases of firms inter­
locked in externality problems having bargainable solu­
tions .
An initial reaction to these examples is that they are 
insignificant in terms of the relevant industries as a 
whole. Isolated cases of externality are not likely to have 
a significant impact on the price in any market because,
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in a competitive market, firms are price takers. It is 
unusual that all of Coase's examples seem to be loca­
tional anomolies which are not characteristic of the par­
ticular industries as a whole. However, the Coase Theorem 
does indeed apply even in these cases and its application 
is far from trivial. An important aspect of the theorem 
developed in this and the following chapter is that firms
should locate and relocate based on the external effects
46produced and received. In this context the Coase Theorem 
may imply that no pollution should exist at any one or, in 
fact, all locations. Hence, Coase's examples are con­
sistent with his theorem.
Moreover, there are two examples where the small 
number case has industry-wide implications. The first is
the famous case of the apple and bees externality used by
47Meade (52). Certainly here we have two industries 
where the externality relationship is industry-wide.
The second case deals with the shellfish industry. Com­
mercial clamming in the estuaries of the southeastern 
United States using mechanical harvesting devices may result 
in externalities that influence the production of other
46This result can be extended to firms of multiple 
industries, so that the externality relationship of any 
firm in one industry may not be exactly the same as that of 
any other firm in that industry. This point is addressed 
in Chapter VI.
47At least, many other types of agricultural endeavors 
require the service of bees. See especially, Cheung (73) 
and Johnson (73).
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commercial seafood. Specifically, the interdependencies
between oystering and clamming embody properties of the
small number case. Because most clamming and oystering
occurs in the same areas, the externality relationship is
48significant m  terms of industry production.
Another example of the presence of Type III exter­
nalities is the emergence of zoning ordinances. Although 
many of these regulations pertain to consumers, the wide
variety of commercial zones suggest significant exter-
49nalities of location among firms as well. An obvious 
question is whether the zoning ordinances are a necessary 
means to achieve efficiency or are merely rent transfers 
obtained through the political market.
The Extended Specification
Model III from the last chapter is essentially the
same here. The externality is a "one-on-one" locational
50relationship between two firms. If the externality
48 It has been pointed out by Johnson (73) that any 
externalities which exist in the bee industry are effec­
tively internalized. Likewise, Maloney et. al. (77) claim 
that the oyster-clam problem is internalized if market 
processes are permitted to function. It is the purpose of 
this paper to prove why market forces will necessarily 
internalize externality in these cases.
49Shopping centers are a good example of private 
market internalization.
"^This simplification can be easily modified without 
changing the results. Such a modification is necessary 
when considering the application of Model III to Type II 
externalities. This discussion is deferred, in part, to 
Chapter V I ,
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effect produced by a firm in industry one is received by 
a firm in industry two, it is received by only one such 
firm. However, there is no argument in the production 
function that requires a firm in one industry to locate in 
the proximity of a firm in the other industry. Thus,
Model III can be simply extended to allow for avoidance 
of the externality. The aggregate externality constraint 
used here will include isolated as well as joint production 
of the two goods. Still assuming that there are S loca­
tions and two sites at each, we now allow for one site to 
remain vacant. Whereas in Chapter III the number for 
firms in the two industries was assumed equal, this is no 
longer the case. Some locations may house only firms in 
industry one, some only firms in industry two, and some 
may house a firm from both industries. However, only one 
firm from an industry may produce at a location.^
Although the Type III externality was developed in 
the last chapter, a review of that discussion in light of 
the extended model may be enlightening. As we will see, 
the extension implies efficient outcomes that may include 
pollution at some locations and not at others. In fact,
Even though there are two sites, only one is avail­
able to each industry. This assumption is equivalent to 
assuming pollution may or may not exist at a location.
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as in Coase's examples, efficiency may require that no
52firm actually receives pollution.
In this model, the private nature of a Type III 
externality is embodied in the "one-on-one" nature of exter­
nality production and reception. One firm produces exactly 
what another receives; hence, y-^  = y ^  That this is a 
private externality situation is obvious for positive 
externalities. When a firm in industry two receives the 
effects of a positive externality from a firm in industry 
one, no other firm in industry two can receive those bene­
fits. The externality is private because it is excludable. 
Symmetrically, if the externality is negative, the avoid­
ance of the harm by one firm in industry two prohibits 
such avoidance by another firm. In the case of negative 
externalities, potential locations for all firms are 
assumed finite. As discussed previously, if they were 
infinite no externality would exist. Because a negative 
externality is costly, and depending on the liability 
rule, entrants into one or the other industry will always 
wish to avoid the externality in order to maximize profit. 
The existence of an externality requires that the demand 
for sites by firms in both industries must be so great
In the case of the doctor and the confectioner, the 
appropriate social choice was not between doctoring and 
candy in the aggregate, but between doctoring or candy 
making or both at that location. Coase implies this but 
additional emphasis and specific modeling is necessary 
to show why.
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that firms from the two industries are forced to locate 
"next" to each other.
Consider Figure IV-1 and the following scenario.
There are S locations. At each location there is a site 
for a firm from both industry one and industry two. Assume 
firms in industry one fill their sites from the left, while 
firms in industry two enter from the right. If an exter­
nality producing firm and a receiving firm locate at "j", 
a negative spillover is received. Location "j" will be 
occupied by a firm from both industries if and only if 
locations 1 ... j- 1  contain industry one firms, and loca­
tions j + 1  ... S contain industry two firms. By the 
definition of a relevant negative spillover, the sum of 
the total profits of the externality related firms at 
location "j" is less than the sum of the total profits 
of an isolated firm in industry one and an isolated firm 
in industry two. Such overlapping (location by a firm at 
a site where it will either produce or receive a negative 
externality) will be avoided if possible.
Only when there is scarcity of locations will the 
profit maximizing behavior of the firms in the two indus­
tries allow a negative externality to exist. In this case, 
when a firm in industry two locates away from a firm in 





53in industry two a pollution-free location. The site 
specific nature of the externality makes it private.
Extended Pareto Efficiency 
Results From Model III
In this section the aggregate externality constraint 
for Model III are extended to include the possibility 
of isolated firms in both industries as discussed above. 
The number of locations in the economy is fixed at S.
At each location there are two sites. However, only one 
firm of each industry may locate there. Even though the 
production functions of all firms in the same industry 
are identical, the externality received by isolated firms 
in industry two is zero. Also, the effect on social wel­
fare of the externality produced by isolated firms in
industry one is zero. The Pareto welfare function to be
. . . 54maximized is:
53As previously noted, for expositional purposes the 
externality is assumed to be "one-on-one." This assump­
tion could be modified so that many producing firms and 
many receiving firms could be affected, as long as the 
number was small enough to allow for bargaining. Clearly 
if an infinite number of producing firms could be asso­
ciated with an infinte number of receiving firms at each 
location there would be no negative externality because 
there would be no scarcity of alternative locations.
54The terms w j , y^, p^, (p, and a  ^ are the Lagrangian
multipliers. The resource not sold by each consumer has 
been relabeled as x . for notational clarity.
^ J
Four types of firms can be identified: Firm Ones and
Twos produce and receive the externality, respectively;
Firms Threes are isolated producers in industry one; Firm
Fours are isolated producers in industry two. Thus
EI+n.f1 (-) is the production constraint for the economy. 
i=l 1
Because a Firm One and Firm Two share a location, n^ =
and the location constraint for the economy can be expressed
as S - S4n . .
i=2
The Pareto welfare function, Q, can be looked upon as 
a non-linear program where
n 2 + 113 + 1I4 < S.
According to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions either
(S - Sn.) - 0 
i
or
cf > =  0 ,
where (j) is the Lagrangian multiplier on the constraint.
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The implication of this condition is clear when the partials 
of ft with respect to each n^ are examined. Substituting
{P^, i = 1, 3} for {p^, i = 1, 3} as in Chapter II we
, 55 find:
1 ) 9ft/ 3n1 = 9ft/3n2 =
52 (Uifi (-) + P ^ i  - P3 X i} “ * = 0
i = l
9ft/9n^ = + Pi^ 3  “ P 3 X 3 “  ^ = 0
9ft/9n4 = U4 f4 ( • ) + P 2 q 4 ~ P 3 x 4 - >p = 0
If (p is positive (locations are scarce) the value of
<p can be interpreted as the Pareto efficiency shadow price
on each location. The economic interpretation of this
5 6shadow price is that of a rent on each location.
The economic interpretation of the results of this 
model center on the term <p, the rent on each location.
Each location has three alternative uses. Both goods can 
be produced, only good one can be produced, or only good 
two produced. Call these activities A, B, and C, respec­
tively. Equation Set 1 shows that any or all of these 
activities may be Pareto efficient at the S available
5 5As was the case in the previous models {p^, i=l,3}
can ultimatelv be set equal to {P-, i=l,3} because all lo .A .
M i 3 3
terms cancel. Also the marginal cost conditions for a
Pareto maximum are the same as those for Model III, Chapter
II, with the addition that P. = P-,/(dq. /dx. ) , i = 3, 4.
I"- ^
5 6The rent on a location is collected from both sites.
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locations. In other words, only activity A may occur at 
all S locations, only activity B at all locations, or only 
activity C. Also, activity A may occur at some locations 
and activities B or C at the others, etc.
Equation Set 1 (disregarding the terms involving the 
implicit production functions) shows the rent equality 
condition for each location allowing for all possible 
alternative welfare maxima assuming the other first order 
conditions are satisfied. The model allows for isolated 
production or joint production of the two goods so long as 
the difference between total revenues and costs equals the 
rent, <p. If the difference between total revenues and 
costs for the alternative uses of a location all yield <p, 
all those activities occur at separate locations at the 
welfare maximum. If for any potential use of a location, 
the difference between revenues and costs is less than 1, 
that use efficiently occurs at no location. In other words, 
d) must be equal at each location and has the value of the 
difference between total revenues and costs at each loca­
tion regardless of the activity that occurs there. The 
relative prices of good one and good two and the effect of 
the externality may rule out one or two of the three pos­
sible activities. We can think of an inefficient activity 
as one where the difference between total revenues and costs
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are not enough to cover d . An efficient activity is one 
that generates enough revenues to cover the resource cost 
and the rent.
Intuitively, the rent.is a measure of the social cost 
of not using a location in the most efficient manner. This 
result can be shown by means of the following scenario.
If expansion of industry two causes an isolated producer 
of good one to become a joint producer, what is the "loss" 
to society? It is the difference between the value of
the output of good one by an isolated producer and the
value of the output of good one by a joint producer,
Plq3 " Plql
plus the difference in the cost of resources expended,
P3X 1 “ P3X 3
These two terms express the potential decrease in the pro­
duction of and the potential increase in cost.
The "gain" from such a move is the value of good 
two produced less the cost of good two,
P2q 2 “ P3X 2 
The move will increase society's welfare if
P2q 2 " P3X 2 > Plq3 “ Plql “ P3X1 + P3X 3
which is to say,
Technically, if the difference between total reve­
nues and costs is not equal to <p, the difference is made up 
by y-j_f1 (*). This term is a measure of how close the activity 
comes to making the efficient solution. Because n. is, 
then, equal to zero, the aggregate production-consumption 
identity is fulfilled.
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2) ' E* P^ iqi P3X i) > Plq3 P3X3
1=1
Hence, if the profitability of joint production (left hand 
side of Equation 2) is greater than independent production 
of good one (right hand side of Equation 2), it should be 
undertaken, but not if it is less.
These conditions show that when there are alternative 
uses of each location the marginal welfare effect of each 
use must be identical. Industry output adjustments can be 
thought of as occurring as in the scenario above to achieve 
a movement to the optimal solution. At the optimal solu­
tion isolated production of good one, isolated production 
of good two, joint production, or any combination of these 
three may occur at the S locations.
Summary
This chapter has developed an industry structure for 
the small number, private externality assuming that loca­
tional confinement is the delimiter of the external effects. 
This structure allows for isolated production or the avoid­
ance of the externality. The Pareto efficiency conditions 
show that such isolation, indeed, may exist at the optimal 
solution. For a negative externality to exist at all there 
must be a scarcity of locations. If such scarcity exists, 
these uses of the locations that yields the maximum differ­
ence between revenues and costs are efficient. This dif­
ference can be considered a rent on each location.
For the Coase Theorem to hold it is necessary that the 
behavior of profit maximizing firms embody these extended 
Model III results. In the next chapter the behavior of 
profit maximizing firms and the industry adjustment based 
on such behavior are explored. At that time further con­
sideration is given to the alternative, efficient equi­




The Coase Theorem holds that in the case of zero bar­
gaining costs an externality will be efficiently .internal­
ized by the affected parties without government intervention. 
Implied by the theorem is that the rule of liability has 
no effect on the allocation of resources. The purpose of 
this chapter is to show how the competitive adjustment 
mechanism does achieve an efficient allocation of resources 
regardless of the liability rule.
From the last chapter, Pareto optimality requires a 
rent to exist on each location if a negative externality is 
experienced in the economy. This rent must be equal at all 
locations and absorb ail of the profit regardless of the 
type of production carried out there. This chapter shows 
how the competitive adjustment process acting on these 
rents reassigns production at each location until efficiency 
obtains. Because a rent must exist for efficiency in the 
case of pollution, the liability rule is inconsequential.
In the Coasian case, all locations are homogeneous 
even though they may have different uses. The different 




of pollution at a location. The Pareto conditions on 
rents indicate that the potential for avoidance of the 
externality at some locations is just as important as its 
proper internalization v/here it occurs.
The purpose of this chapter is to show how the com­
petitive market mechanism fulfills the Pareto efficiency 
conditions. In order to do this, the actions of a profit 
maximizing firm that produces both good one and good two 
are shown to fulfill the Pareto conditions v/here pollu­
tion occurs. At the same time, the analysis of the joint 
profit maximizing firm is developed in a way that can be 
used to compare the relative profitability of isolated 
and joint production. Next, a distinction between rent 
and economic profit is made in order to describe the com­
petitive adjustment process. Rent is the payment to the 
scarce factor of production locations. Profit is the pay­
ment for the short run misallocation of resources. The 
process of industry expansion and contraction is first 
developed in the case of no external effects. After the 
definitions of rent and profit are explored, the case of 
a negative externality is presented.
-’8 'rhus the simplifying assumption that two firms of 
one industry can not produce at one location is made. T.he 
model only allows for isolated production of either good, 




Assume one firm maximizes the profit of simultaneously 
producing both good one and good two. The constrained 
profit function is:
2
it = -2 ^{Piqi - P 3 xi + 6 if1 (-)} + ■My1 ~ V 2 )
The last constraint can be substituted into the production 
function f^(.) ; and y-, can be relabeled as v. The first 
order conditions can be expressed as:^'
1 ) P-j^ = P 3 /(dq1 /dx1) - P 7 (3q0 /3y) (dy/dq1)
2) P 2 = P 3 /(dq9/dx2)
These expressions are identical to the marginal cost 
requirements for Pareto optimality from Model III where 
the externality exists.
Equation 1 can be rewritten as:
la) P 1 - ? 3 /(dq 1 /dx1) = -P2 (3 q 2 / 3Y ) (dy/db-^)
The left hand side of Equation la is a typical price- 
minus-marginal-cost expression for good one and is the 
change in profits due to a change in good one without 
considering the externality. The right hand side of 
Equation la is the effect on profits due to the effect 
on q 2 .
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Important in the derivation of Equation 1 is the 
fact that y and are joint products. Hence, -f^ =
fqdqi/dxi + fydy/dxi*
The two sides of Equation la can be integrated to 
yield total profit expressions. 0 1^ Thus, / {P ^ ” ^ 3 / (dq^/dx^)} 
dq^ = /P1 dq 1 - / {P 3 /(dq1 /dx1) } dq]_ = P - C (q.^ , where 
C (q^) is the total cost of producing q-, from x-^ . The profit 
resulting from the production of good one can be defined 
as it 1 = P^q^ - C (q^) , where q^ is determined from the solu­
tion of Equations 1 and 2. Likewise, the profit resulting 
from the production of good two is r 2 = - /{P 2 OQt/Sy)
(dy/dq^) }dq^ = k - D t q ^ q ^ q ^ ,  where D ^ ,  q 0 )q1 is the 
value of the damage imposed on the production of good two 
by the production of good one, and k is the constant of 
integration.0 -^ The values of D(q^, q 9) and k are dependent 
on the level of q 2 determined from the solution of Equation 
2. If q^ = 0, k is the level of profit made by the isolated 
production of good two. The shape of tt 1 is determined by 
the relationship of x^ to q^, which, by assumption, is 
characterized by increasing and then decreasing returns to 
. The shape of ft2 is determined by the relationship of y 
to q^ and to q 9 . By assumption, the negative externality's 
effect increases at an increasing rate. For simplicity, we 
assume that y = qj_.
In order to relate these total profit functions to 
each other and to the marginal profit functions from which
a n
This approach is used in Gifford (74) and Maloney (77)
C 1
By assumption of the nature of the production 
function there is no constant of integration in the con­
struction of tt 1 .
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they are derived, it is enlightening to show the equality 
from Equation la as a tangency of tt 1 and i r 2 . To accomplish 
this we simply invert tt’1 and measure the level of tt1 in the 
opposite direction of it2 along the vertical axis. By 
bringing this inverted i t 1  curve down onto the rr2 curve, the 
tangency results. Such a graph is shown in Figure V-l.
Point U, Panel A, is the appropriate tangency.
From this graph not only do we see the level of joint 
profits, but also the level of profit resulting from iso­
lated production of each good. In Figure V-l, Panel A,
the distance 0.0_ is the maximum nrofit from producing both 1 ^
good one and good two; the distance ^ 2 ^ 4  2's t i^e maxinium 
profit from producing only good two; the distance 0 ^ 3  ->-s 
the maximum profit from producing only good one.
Figure V-2 shows the decline in the profit levels as 
price falls: the dashed-line curves show the post price-
decline profit levels. In other words, as P^ decreases, 
the tt 1 function is compressed in a horizontal fashion and 
rotates upward about point 0^. Profit falls, as does the 
profit maximizing quantity of good one if produced in 
isolation. As V 2 declines, m 2 simply drops down.^2 After 
such a shift in either curve, tt 1 must be brought back down 
onto tt2 until a tangency similar to point U, Figure V-l, 
Panel A, again occurs. Hence, after a price change, the
r o
The vertical distance between the old and new 















relationship of the distances 0 ^0 2 j> ®2 R4 ' an<^  ^1 ^ 3  c^an<les-^^ 
The relative profitability of these three activities forms 
the basis of the industry adjustment mechanism in the case 
of externalities.
Industry Adjustment: No Externality
As in the Pareto welfare model of the last chapter, 
consider an economy having only S locations at which the 
firms of the two industries may produce. In the case of 
no externality, assume only one firm can produce at each 
location. Again assume that there are no costs associated 
with relocation of firms. Also, the S locations in the 
economy require no maintenance and they are homogeneous.
While locations and the input x are both resources for the 
economy as a whole, they are not substitutes for the firm.
One firm only can operate one s i t e . 64
In order to begin the industry adjustment, allow 
industry one to expand its output by expanding the number 
of firms until the excess profit of each firm is zero.
Firms in industry one occupy n^ locations. Now allow 
firms in industry two to begin production.
Note that second order conditions can be investi­
gated by examining the relationship O 2 P-4 y  0 ^ 2  t ®1 R 3 '
1 R 3 — :L °2R4 must true for the second order con­
ditions of^joint profit maximization to be met.
6^In other words, the function f1 (-) is applicable to 
one site only. Also, for the economy, output is a linearly 
homogeneous function of the two resources, sites and x.
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If the profit from the production of good two falls 
to zero before all S sites are occupied, locations are not 
scarce and rent is zero. If all sites are occupied, i.e., 
n 2 = S - n'^ , and if the profit of the firms in industry 
t;^ o is positive, locations are scarce and a rent will arise. 
Figure V-3 depicts the allocation of the sites at this point. 
The profit of a firm in industry two (tt2) is positive, 
the profit of a firm in industry one (tt 1 ) is zero, and 
rent at all locations is zero.
A new firm will enter industry two because of the
excess profits. In order to enter, the firm must pay one
0 2 of the landlords of the n^ sites some portion of the tt .
Because the rent is currently zero, this payment, s, may
be arbitrarily small.
When the industry two firm drives the industry one 
firm out of business, it causes a reduction in the output
in industry one. Standard theory tells us the price of
good one and, hence, the net revenue (revenue minus the 
cost of the resource x ) ^  Qf the firms in industry one 
rises. Under the normal assumptions of competition, the 
actions of one firm have an imperceptible effect on price.
But as more firms enter industry two because of the excess 
profits, the result is observable.
Figure V-4 shows the reallocation of sites that 
results in a change in the net revenue levels. The number
6 5Net 'revenue is identical to profit only if the rent 
on the location is zero.
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FIGURE V-3














of sites occupied by firms in industry one has fallen from 
n^ to n^ -. The net revenue of the firms in industry one 
grows because of the reduction in output resulting from 
the displacement of firms in industry one. However, this 
net revenue will not be kept by the industry one firms. 
Instead it is paid to the landlords of the sites at which 
they produce. Moreover, the rent paid by a firm in industry 
two will also equal this amount.
The net revenue of the firm in industry one is in 
this case the opportunity cost of all locations. Competi­
tion among the landlords will drive the rent to this 
level. A firm in industry two can always relocate to a 
site occupied by a firm in industry one by offering to 
pay e more than this amount. A landlord can always offer 
a site for £ less and induce a different firm to move in. 
Competition will force £ to approach zero and the rent at 
all sites to approach the net revenue of the least pro­
fitable firm.
As this process unfolds, the distinction between 
rent and profit develops. Rene is the payment for scarce 
locations. Its value is the lowest net revenue of all 
firms producing. The value of the rent is determined by 
relocating the existing firms in the two industries.
Assuming that the industry output levels remain constant, 
competition for the scarce locations determines the rent. 
Firms will continue to relocate so long as rents are not 
equal. Excess profit can then be computed as the difference
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between net revenue and rent. Mew firms will continue 
to enter the market so long as excess profits are positive.
The terms R 1 and R 2 can be defined as net revenue 
for firms in industry one and two, respectively. As the 
industry adjustment occurs, the rent, (j), is equal to the 
in in (R1, R 2) . Profit can then be defined as tt 1 - r.1 - j 
and tt2 = R 2 - j).
As in the standard competitive model, output of the 
industry with positive profit expands. In the case of 
scarce locations, the expansion of the industry experienc­
ing positive profit causes the contraction of the other 
industry as one location changes from the production of 
one good to the other. The joint industry equilibrium 
occurs when excess profits are sero, i.e., r 1 = s 2 = 0 .
At this point the rent equals the net revenue of the firms 
in both industries, and the net revenue of the firms at 
all locations is equal.
The importance of the distinction between rent and 
profit is simply that profits are caused by short run 
resources misallocation. They mirror the forces at work 
to change the output of the two industries. Those forces 
cause an expansion of the industry experiencing positive 
profits. Rent, on the other hand, reflects the scarcity 
of sites and measures the opportunity cost to each firm of 
a location given the current allocation of resources.
Rent is the maximum payment attainable by the landlord, 
resulting from the exchange of sites by two firms. The
88
computation of rent assum.es that the output levels of the 
two industries remain constant. Obviously, these processes 
may be at work simultaneously. The distinction is drawn 
in order to clearly identify the equilibrating mechanism.
Industry Adjustment: Negative Externality
Nov; let us assume that the production of both goods 
may occur at one location but that in so doing a negative 
externality occurs. This pollution causes the cost of 
producing good two to increase. There are still S loca­
tions and either good one, good two, or both can be pro­
duced at each. Note, however, that two firms of the same 
industry cannot locate at one site.
Using the same scenario as in the non-pollution case, 
allow the number of firms in industry one to initially 
expand until the profit from the production of good one 
is zero. Then allow firms to enter industry two until all 
S locations are filled. Scarcity of locations is evidenced 
by positive profits made by the firms in industry two 
when all locations are filled. At this point rents are 
still zero.
The relative profitability of the different potential 
activities at each site can be examined by means of the 
graphical analysis developed earlier in this chapter. The 
net revenue made by the isolated producers of good two 
is termed R “; the net revenue made by the isolated producers 
of good one is termed R 3; R 1 + R 2 is the net revenue from 
the joint profit maximizing production of both goods.
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Figure V-5 shows the situation where R 3 = 0, R 4 > 0, and 
R 1 + R 2 > 0 even though joint production of the two goods 
does not occur. Recall that positive net revenue from the 
production of good one is measured downward from point 0 ;^ 
positive net revenue from the production of good two is 
measured upward from point 0 9 .
(Z C
Returning to our scenario, as drawn, the profit
from isolated good two production, R 4, is the distance
0_R. . Because this is greater than the net revenue from 2 4
either isolated good one production, O-^R^, or joint pro­
duction, a ^3-rrri w i H  enter industry two and drive
out a firm from industry one. This occurs by means of the 
new industry two firm paying an arbitrarily small amount 
of R 4 to the landlord of an existing isolated good one 
producer. At this point a rent, £, exists albeit arbi­
trarily small. All firms will be forced to pay the rent 
because of the scarcity of locations and competition for 
them.
As more firms enter industry two as isolated pro­
ducers, the net revenue functions of all firms shift. The 
net revenue from the production of good one increases and 
that from the production of good two falls. Assume that 
the magnitude of these shifts occurs as depicted in 
Figure V- 6 . Also assume that isolated good one production



















still exists at some locations., Because the net revenue 
of isolated good two production still exceeds both joint and 
isolated good one production, firms continue to enter industry 
two as isolated producers, driving out firms from, industry 
one.
Applying the definitions of profit and rent from the 
last section we find that the rent is R 3, the net revenue 
from the isolated production of good one. Because iso­
lated good one production still exists and yields the 
lowest net revenue it is the opportunity cost of all 
locations. If a landlord attempts to extract more than R 3 
from a producer of good two, the firm, merely exchanges 
locations with a good one producer by offering its land­
lord R 3 plus s. Competition drives z  to zero. The rent 
<p = R 3 = min (R3, R 1*) . 6 7
The profit levels of the various potential activities 
are tt 1 + tt2 = R 1 + R 2 - h, ir3 = R 3 - 5 , and -** = R 1* - 1, 
where it1* > tt 1 + tt2 > it 3 . The adjustment rule is that the 
activity with the highest profit drives cut the activity 
with the lowest. Hence, firms continue to enter industry 
two as isolated producers, thus driving out firms from 
industry one.
Following this scenario to one of many possible out­
comes, assume that as firms enter industry two, R 1* falls
*7
R 1 + R 2 is not included in the min (*) statement 
because no location houses such production.
into equality with R 1 + R 2. This is shown in Figure V-7. 
Because at this point isolated good two production has the 
same profitability as joint production, the firms cur­
rently producing good one in isolation may or may not leave 
industry one. However, they will not continue isolated 
production. Because the net revenue of isolated good one 
production remains below the other potential activities 
it is eliminated from all sites; some sites will house 
joint production. Thus, the opportunity cost of a location 
becomes min (R1 + R 2, R 1*) . Because they are equal, as 
assumed by Figure V-7, the rent wipes out all the profit 
and the industries are in equilibrium. a 1 + tt2 = tt 3 = a 1* = 
0 . 6 8
There are six other possible equilibria, all shown 
and labeled in Figures V-3— V-13. In all cases excess 
profits are zero and the rent absorbs all of the net 
revenue yielded by production at each location. It is 
important to note that these equilibria do not depend on 
the initial position of the industry adjustment process, 
but depend on the relative demands and costs including the 
effect of the externality. From any disequilibrium, the 
same equilibrium will obtain, determined only by the rela­
tive costs and demands in the two industries.
The industry adjustment process in the case of pol­
lution is the same as in its absence. The activity with
C g
The excess profit of an activity which is pursued 








Isolated good one production
is eliminated.
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R 1 + R 2 = R 3 = R l
Both .isolated good one and good 
two as well as joint 
production occurs.
the highest profit drives out the activity with the lowest, 
and all resources are sold at their opportunity cost. In 
the case of scarce locations, the opportunity cost of a 
site is the lowest net revenue attained by production at 
any site.
Conclusions
The implications of these results in terms of the 
Coase Theorem are:
1) The equilibrium of the competitive market mechani 
in the Coasian case exhibits the optimality conditions 
derived in the previous chapter. The assumptions made 
about the behavior of the market participants are that 
producers profit maximize and that landlords rent maximize. 
Profit maximization ensures the marginal cost efficiency 
conditions. Competition and rent maximization cause pro­
duction at each location to afford the same, rent and the 
rent absorbs all of the net revenue. Thereby, the industry 
size conditions for Pareto optimality are fulfilled. Thus, 
the Coase Theorem holds.
2) In order to achieve optimality and because of 
competition, pollution may or may not exist in the economy 
or at any particular site. The allocation of resources in 
such a way that no externality exists is as important in 
achieving efficiency as is its correct internalization 
where it does occur. At the locations where the exter­
nality is optimally avoided, it is interesting to note
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that the net revenue or quasi-rent does not exist to allow 
pollution to exist. The competitive mechanism assures 
this .
3) Liability does not matter. If pollution exists
so must a rent. Rent maximization by the landlord precludes 
the effect of the liability rule. Even if firms in industry 
one are not sanctioned by lav; for their pollution, the 
number of polluting firms will not expand past the effi­
cient level. New firms will not enter industry one and 
cause pollution unless they can make the net revenues 
necessary to pay the rent afforded by isolated good two 
production. If efficiency requires isolated good two 
production, the competitive mechanism will not afford the 
net revenue sufficient to drive out the isolated producers. 
This is true e^en though the firms in industry one may 
legally pollute.
4) If at a particular location more than one land­
lord exists or if no landlord exists, the results are not 
mitigated. If no landlord exists, the firms in the industry 
with the pollution property right will effectively become 
the landlords. If more than one landlord exists, bargain­
ing among them will produce the efficient s o l u t i o n . ^
6 9'This assumes that bargaining among the landlords 
can be carried out with zero transactions costs. If so, the 
maximum rent at any one location is the efficient rent. 
However, there is a problem with extortion in this case 
as will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Summary
This chapter has presented a proof of the Coase 
Theorem. It has been demonstrated that profit maximi­
zation, rent maximization and competition for scarce loca­
tions will result in the fulfillment of the Pareto condi­
tions for a Type III externality. The marginal cost 
conditions are satisfied by joint profit maximization where 
the existence of the externality is called for and by 
simple profit maximization where it is not. Rent maxi­
mization ensures that the externality exists at the effi­
cient number of locations. The distinction between rent 
and excess profit points out how the competitive mechanism 
adjusts the output of the two industries and generates 
the net revenue necessary to create or stop pollution 
where required for efficiency. As held by Coase, the 
definition of property rights has no effect on the solution.
CHAPTER VI
IMPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS OF THE RESULTS 
Introduction
The previous chapters have developed the necessary con­
ditions for Pareto welfare maximization in three different 
models. These models are specified in a way consistent with 
both the Pigovian and Coasian concepts of the externality 
problem. From an examination of these three models the 
Pigovian and Coasian traditions are reconciled and the Coase 
Theorem proven.
The conclusions reached in this paper follow from the 
specification of the aggregate externality constraint used 
in the three models. These specifications were developed 
by appealing to an outline of externality problems that 
separates the publicness or privateness of reception from 
the question of bargaining costs.
Bargaining costs have been used in the past to dis­
tinguish the Pigovian and Coasian cases. This has caused 
confusion in both analysis and policy implications. Baumol 
(72) points out that both Buchanan and Coase, in letters, 
express confusion and concern over who should pay for pol­
lution in the laundry-factorv example. The possibilities 
run the gamut from all should pay to either the producer 
or receiver of the externality should receive compensation.
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At the same time that results of the small number case 
have cast doubt on Pigovian policy, the question of who 
should pay has been used to attack the small number case 
itself. If, as the proponents of the Coase Theorem claim, 
the liability rule is inconsequential, the question of who 
should pay does not affect industry adjustment. However, 
other writers have claimed that industry adjustment and 
equilibria are, in fact, affected by the liability rule.
The liability rule is not symmetric and, hence, the Coase 
Theorem does not hold.
By addressing the public/private reception question 
separately, we are able to consistently identify the appro­
priate policy and thereby reconcile these opposing views. 
This chapter reviews the reconciliation of the Pigovian 
and Coasian traditions and the proof of the Coase Theorem 
presented in the preceeding chapters. Extensions and 
ramifications of the Coase Theorem are then studied.
Review of the Findings
The outline of externality problems suggested by con­
sidering both public/private reception and large/small 
numbers is fourfold. Type I is large number, public recep­
tion; Type II is large number, private reception; Type
III is small number, private reception; and Type IV is
7 nsmall number, public reception. u The xnteresting thing
70Type IV is ignored here.
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about this scheme, however, is the notion of privateness. 
The key contribution of this research is that the cause of 
private reception can be the scarcity of locations in the 
reception area. In fact, in Type III externalities this is 
assumed to always be the case.
Public reception means that the amount of the exter­
nality received by one firm in no way diminishes the amount 
available to others. On the other hand, private reception 
is a situation where the amount of the externality avail­
able is somehow constrained. This can occur either by a 
reduction in the quantity of externality due to reception 
by one firm or by a reduction in the locations available 
for the reception of externality due to the existence of a 
receiving firm.
Who Should Pay?
The public reception case is addressed by Model I.
The results are clearly that the producer of the external­
ity should pay a price equal to the harm caused by the 
externality. This payment is recognised in both the 
average cost and the marginal cost requirements for each 
firm. The receiving firm in the public case should not 
be taxed or compensated. Again, this result is showrn by 
the absence of explicit externality expressions in either 
the marginal or average cost conditions for the receiving 
firm. This result is intuitively pleasing. In the 
public reception case, no scarcity of the externality
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7 1exists. Thus, the price of the externality raced by the 
receiving firm should be zero.
The private reception case is developed in both Models 
II and III. Model II examines a situation where the actual 
aggregate quantity of the externality is reduced by the 
amount received by one firm. The welfare maximizing condi­
tions in the case of a positive externality are identical 
to those of a normal input produced as the joint product of 
an output. The producing firm is compensated for the
externality and the receiving firm pays for the portion
7 0of the externality it receives. “ If the externality is
negative the reverse holds: producers pay and receivers
are compensated.
In general, a problem of defining and protecting the
property rights is the causal factor of such a Type II
externality, either positive or negative. For instance, we
may have a positive externality problem because the spill-
7 3over is a "common access" resource to the receivers. 
Government action is called for. The form of this govern­
ment action could be a Pigovian tax where the tax rate is
71 . . .Scarcity of the externality means ability to avoid
the effects if negative.
7?
An example in a normal market is where the by-products 
of cracking gasoline are sold to firms that use them as 
inputs.
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The case of shrimp growing up in marsh lands was 
found by Maloney et. al. (77) to be such an externality.
The problem of the commons occurs in the ocean where property 
rights are hard to define. The externality is that oyster- 
ing, clamming, and crabbing affect the number and size of 
shrimp leaving the estuary.
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7 &
P2 ' This rate is levied per unit of exter­
nality. Externality producers should be charged at this 
rate and externality receivers compensated at this rate for 
negative spillovers. The direction of the payment changes 
with the sign of the externality.
Alternatively, the externality may be privately 
received because of the scarcity of locations in the recep­
tion area. This situation is examined in Model III. Model 
III was extended to include the possibility of isolated 
production. The results are simply that the firms involved 
in the externality at any location must act lihe joint 
profit maximizers.
It is the extended Model III that gives the welfare 
conditions pertinent to the Coase Theorem. If firms cannot 
avoid the negative externality, locations must be scarce. 
Hence, a rent exists. Assuming zero transactions costs the 
rent maximizing behavior of the landlords yields opti­
mality. Optimality requires that the rents be equal across
7 5all locations. 3y explicitly noting that the cause of 
the externality is the scarcity of locations, rent maxi­
mization can be shown to produce a Pareto welfare maximum. 
Thus the Coase Theorem is demonstrated.
Traditionally, the Coase Theorem has implied either 
party can be made to pay for the externality. More
74See Model II, Table III-l.
^^Joint profit maximization ensures that the rents 
are maximized at each location.
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precisely, Chapters III and IV show that both parties should 
be made to pay. In Type III externalities, where the Coase 
Theorem is directly applicable, both parties are made to 
pay in terms of the rent collected by the landlords. If 
autonomous firms are involved in the externality, the lia­
bility rule is inconsequential precisely because both 
parties pay rent equal to the exact amount of their share 
of the maximum joint profits.
If we apply Model III to the case of Type II exter­
nalities where the externality is private due to scarce 
locations, the result is also that all parties should pay. 
This is a large number case because the number of producers 
or receivers at each location prohibits bargaining. The 
Pareto requirements are simply that all the firms at each 
location joint profit maximize. A straightforward govern­
ment policy is to act as the auctioneer of environmental 
purity. The polluting firms pay for pollution rights; 
the externality receiving firms pay for purity. Maximizing 
government revenues, maximizes welfare. Even though within 
a single pollution area the externality is a public good 
subject to the free rider problem, government can force all 
receiving parties to pay. The technique of the taxing 
procedure requires further study outside of this investi­
gation. The point here is that theoretically both pro­
ducer and receiver should pay.
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Summary
We can summarize these results in such a way as to 
delineate the externality situations relevant to the 
Pigovian tradition and those relevant to the Coase Theorem.
A) Type I externalities are Pigovian cases.
A simple, unilateral tax or subsidy like that 
proposed by Baumol is appropriate.
B) Type III externalities are pure Coasian 
cases. No government policy at all is re­
quired to achieve efficiency.
C) Type II externalities fall under both the 
policy prescriptions of Pigou and Coase.
i.) If the externality is private because
the available quantity is reduced by 
the reception of one firm, a bilateral 
tax and subsidy scheme is called for.
This is the type of Pigovian tax 
discussed by Meade and Gould.
ii) If the externality is private because
of the scarcity of locations in the
reception area, the rent maximizing 
results of the pure Coasian case 
must be implemented by government.
Thus are the Pigovian and Coasian traditions reconciled.
Ramifications of the Coase Theorem
Probably the most obvious criticism of the Coase 
Theorem is that zero transactions costs are assumed. Many 
writers, notably Baumol (72), Daly (74), and Coase (60), 
have argued that transactions costs will significantly 
diminish the applications of the Coase Theorem in real 
world problems.
The essence of the controversy is whether 
the Coase Theorem can legitimately be applied 
to problems of pollution control in the typical 
situation involving large numbers of affected
Ill
parties, not all of whom have access to capital"If.
markets.'D
There are a number of issues involved here. First, when 
does the largeness of numbers create insurmountable trans­
actions costs? Second, when is the externality publicly 
received so that the Coase Theorem becomes analytically 
inappropriate in spite of transactions costs? Finally, 
what is the extension of Coase's arguments to consumers 
involved in externality problems?
These questions cannot be completely addressed here, 
mainly because the analysis used in this research is not 
formulated to answer them. However, our analysis does 
give some insight into these problems.
Public Reception in Actual Pollution Problems
Inasmuch as the pollution is public, the Coase Theorem 
is never applicable either in terms of the necessity or form 
of government action. However, by the analysis presented 
in this paper the actual existence of the Type I externality 
problem is very much in doubt. It appears that purely 
publicly received externalities are unlikely because of 
the general scarcity of locations everywhere. This fact 
implies that the simple Pigovian tax is never applicable.
The appropriate government policy, then, becomes one of 
taxing all parties of the locationally specific externality
7 Fisher and Peterson (76), page 4.
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or doing nothing. The Coase Theorem offers both alter­
natives .
This result is mitigated somewhat by the vagaries 
of nature. Pollution may affect one area or another in 
a very random fashion. However, the appropriate tax asks 
receivers to pay for reducing the expected damage of pol­
lution, and then charges the polluters that same price at 
the equilibrium.
Bargaining Costs
The problem of bargaining costs addressed in the liter­
ature centers on two points. First, if bargaining costs 
are too high to allow private internalization, the cost of 
information necessary to implement the appropriate govern­
ment policy is also prohibitive. The appropriate govern­
ment policy can never be implemented and, hence, standards 
are the most efficient means of achieving a welfare maxi­
mum. Second, if government taxing policy is used, the 
Buchanan-Stubblebine problem appears. Private internal­
ization, if possible, will move the parties away from the 
welfare maximum.
Both of these arguments are based on the confusion' 
between public and private reception. As we have pointed 
out, if the externality is private by the fact of scarce 
locations, two conclusions result. Bot parties should 
pay and the payment is made from rents on locations.
The fact that the tax in a large number case should 
be levied on both parties instead of one, means that
i l i
government can gain information about the severity of the
pollution by the tax revenues obtained from the receivers.
In many cases it can be shown that taxing measures with
administratively simple adjustment rules lead to the ef.fi-
7 7cient solution. Thus, even if private bargaining faces
— T Q
prohibitive transactions costs government action may not.
Moreover, because all parties pay, the Buchanan- 
Stubblebine argument is inappropriate. At the efficient 
solution there will be no tendency for parties to move 
away. Buchanan and Stubblebine assumed a unilateral 
Pigovian tax. With such a tax the pollution receiver still 
has a marginal incentive to bargain even at the optimal 
position. If bargaining costs are underestimated by govern­
ment, a unilateral tax creates inefficiency. However, 
the tax mechanism suggested by the Coase Theorem does not 
generate this problem. When both parties pay a tax, 
there is no marginal incentive toward further bargaining 
at the optimal solution even if bargaining is possible.
Other Government Action
Government, however, may find that certain measures 
can be undertaken to facilitate private internalization.
77Maloney et. al. (77) given an example for a Type II 
externality.
7 RPrivate bargaining may be prohibited because the 
property right is uncertain, antitrust laws jeopardize the 
agreement, extortion may be accused, or consumers are 
involved, Of course the benefit to the affected parties 
may be so small as to make internalization inefficient by 
either government or private action. Government faces none 
of the former problems, however.
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On the other hand, some government action is clearly inap­
propriate. Examples of these are discussed belov/.
An implication of the Coase Theorem is that the pro­
perty rights to a location must be independent of any 
production. Obviously, the owner of the property right 
must be able to allow the production mix at the location to 
change whenever relative profitabilities chance. In terms 
of policy this means that where the usage of government 
owned properties are involved, leasing agreements should 
not be associated with specific production requirements.
An example of this is the wetlands owned by the State of 
South Carolina. Current policy provides for the leasing 
of such for oysteri-ng. However, the lease agreement speci­
fically calls for a certain amount of oystering and renewal 
of the beds. To maintain the ownership right to the wet­
lands, the leasee must produce oysters even though this may 
not be the appropriate output at any given point in time.
To lock a leasee into a specific output combination (in this 
case by requirements on production technology employed) 
will have a detrimental effect on the efficiency of pro­
duction. Acceptable policy would be to lease the rights 
to this land to the highest bidder to do with as he wishes. 
Where the taxing authority owns the locations it can itself 
act as the landlord to achieve the optimum solution by 
maximizing the rents at each location.
"^There is the problem of completely changing the 
characteristics of the land. This may be bad because of 
the national or state heritage, public good aspects.
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Zoning causes a problem similar to production require­
ments. Where zoning captures the basic externality charac­
teristics of land use it may be beneficial because it reduces 
transactions costs. For instance, a general residential 
zoning ordinance may be the first step towards residential 
development internalizing spillover benefits. However, 
the cost it imposes is that the land use patterns cannot 
change dramatically even if that is the optimal solution.
And when a dramatic change is in question, the process used 
to determine the efficacy of the change is not as sensitive 
as the market mechanism.^0
The effect of judicial interpretation in cases which 
fulfill the requirements of the Type III externality is 
effectively zero in the long r u n . ^  The courts in these 
cases can do no more than set property rights which ulti­
mately have no effect except to realign the rents. However, 
if we introduce non-zero bargaining costs or transactions 
costs into the model, appropriate public policy might be
O ^
to define the oldest firm as having the property right.
This is true especially if public policy stresses rapid 
convergence to the optimal solution. Because the property
®^The political mechanism as opposed to the price 
mechanism is used to change the zoning ordinances.
^ F c r  instance, in the cases related by Coase (60) 
where the courts were used to assign property rights the 
outcome is expected to have had no effect on industry 
production.
^ B ruce Yandle, Senior Economist, President's Council 
on Wage and Price Stability, 1976-1977, reports to us that 
the Environmental Protection Agency is considering such a 
policy.
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right can be defined in either way it also follows that it 
can be defined in both ways between different pairs of 
firms involved in the same interindustry externality. The 
effect of defining the property right with the oldest firm 
is to prohibit the gaming or extortion that might take 
place if one industry or the other has the property right 
at each location.
Consider Figure VI-1. Assume industry one has the 
property right to pollute. The landlords of the sites 
appropriate for industry one in Sector A can receive rents 
in the amount of the excess profits available to the iso­
lated producers of good two located there. In the short 
run, however, entry or the threat of entry by a polluter 
might be required in order to gain these rents. In other 
words, if the landlord at an industry two site is reluctant 
to give up his rent, the landlord of the industry one site 
will allow a firm to enter. If entry into industry one 
does occur, the landlord of the circled site in Figure VI-1 
gains rent equal to the profit of a joint venture or equal 
to the profit of isolated production of good one. This 
will drive the price of good one down just enough to make 
it profitable for another firm in industry one to cease 
production. But the landlord of exiting firm will con­
tinue to receive the rent paid by the firm in industry 
two. This is inefficient if entry and exit are costly 








This problem could be eliminated if the oldest firm 
automatically had the property right. Again it makes no 
difference on efficiency grounds who has it. The property 
right definition only determines which landlord gets the 
rents if the two sites at each location are owned sepa­
rately. However, if the oldest firm has the property right 
the landlords of industry two in Sector A, Figure VI-1, 
would be entitled to the rents regardless of who gets them 
in Sector B. There would be no gaming involved in obtain­
ing potential rents. For instance, if demand for industry 
one increased it would cause profit to increase and the 
number of firms in industry one to increase. The situation 
in terms of who is paid the rents would be exactly the 
same as if industry two, as an industry, had the property 
right: entrants into industry one would be forced to
pay the industry two landlords; and the gaming problem 
described above would be avoided.
Multiple Industries
A final extension of the Coase Theorem is that it 
applies to multiple industry externality situations.
Where any two firms are associated by an externality there 
is definitely no necessity for government intervention 
except in terms of the definition of property rights due 
to equity considerations. This is true even if the two 
firms are in industries not usually associated by an exter­
nality. Consider an example. Assume one industry is an 
obnoxious polluter causing harm to surrounding (but only
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closely proximating) firms wherever its firms locate.
Public policy is to do nothing to internalize this cost.
If the firm of the random industry that is harmed in each 
case can profitably move, it will. If not, the appropri­
ate bargaining solution will result. The polluting firms 
will similarly locate, as they should, where they find it 
most profitable. Liability for pollution can be assigned 
to the polluter or not without affecting the output levels 
of any good.
A Final Word
The one extension of these results that was carefully 
avoided was to consumers. Whenever criticisms of the Cease 
Theorem are raised, this is usually found. The normal 
unwillingness to discuss consumers is the problem of income 
effects. However, that is not the case here and probably 
should not be the case elsewhere.
The proof of the Coase Theorem offered here does net 
sidestep the existence of income effects due to the pollu­
tion property rights. It merely shows they do net affect 
the necessary conditions for a welfare maximum. The rents 
paid to the location owners are income. This income may 
change the pattern of demand and affect industry output 
and aggregate pollution. Even so, the welfare conditions 
are unaltered.
The implication, then, is if consumers instead of firms 
are involved, there is no difference. Transactions costs 
may be increased but assume these are infinite and we are
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concerned with the appropriate government policy. The 
Coasian tax appears appropriate. This may be so but it 
deserves further study.
In general the form and mechanism of the Coasian tax in 
large number, privately received externalities requires 
further investigation. The question of what to do with the 
tax revenues may not be easily resolved. Because all par­
ties should pay, when consumers are involved they are taxing 
themselves and paying the revenues back to themselves.
This problem may or may not mitigate the application of 
such a tax.
Regardless of these extensions, the Coase Theorem 
stands as an important theoretical pillar of externality 
theory. Examining it in the way suggested by this work 
points out its richness.
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